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OUTSIDE A BLACK BOX: COURT AND
REGULATORY REVIEW OF INVESTMENT
VALUATIONS OF HARD-TO-VALUE SECURITIES
SALVATORE MASSA*
ABSTRACT
Valuation is a critical function of investment advisers that has
significant implications for both clients and advisers. One potential risk associated with valuation is that an investment adviser may
abuse its position in valuing portfolio assets to accrue higher management and incentive fees to the detriment of clients. Although the
valuation function may be viewed as an objective exercise, adviser
valuations become subject to greater levels of discretion for hardto-value securities, making determinations of adviser abuse less clear.
Depending on the transparency of the adviser, the valuation process itself may become a black box to the client. Securities and Exchange Commission regulation of and enforcement actions over an
investment adviser’s valuations of securities and court review of private litigation have taken different approaches to address this problem. Although Securities and Exchange Commission matters address
questions of whether an adviser has appropriately valued a particular security, the focus of many enforcement matters addresses
the process an adviser used to reach a valuation determination. In
contrast, private litigants are constrained by court views of valuations of hard-to-value securities within the context of the antifraud
statutes. In many cases, courts have taken the position that such
determinations are simply opinions of an adviser. This Article surveys these approaches and concludes that judicial scrutiny should
focus on a process-driven approach for adviser valuations.
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INTRODUCTION
One of the most fundamental functions of any manager of an
investment vehicle is to value the portfolio assets accurately. The
valuation of the portfolio over time reveals the financial performance of the investment and typically determines the fees the
manager receives. In many instances, the valuation function is
easy to discern for the manager and easy to verify for the investor
or advisory client because the portfolio is disclosed and the assets
have readily verifiable market prices. However, many investment
strategies incorporate thinly traded bonds, derivative instruments,
and other securities that do not have transparent market prices.
Further, private funds may contractually limit investor access to
portfolio holdings and may provide themselves with wide latitude
to value the assets.1 In these instances, the United States Securities
and Exchange Commission (“Commission” or “SEC”) and its staff
have recognized the potential for abuse on the part of investment
managers, who have a natural incentive to increase the value of
portfolio assets in order to reap more handsome fees and tout
more attractive returns to prospective investors.2 To address these
1 The term “private fund” is used in the Advisers Act of 1940 and generally
refers to hedge funds. Hedge funds have grown in prominence as an investment
vehicle for sophisticated and institutional investors. For a description of the
origin and general characteristics of hedge funds, see JACK D. SCHWAGER,
MARKET SENSE AND NONSENSE: HOW THE MARKETS REALLY WORK (AND HOW
THEY DON’T) 185–210 (2013).
2 Valuation is “critically important” for all investment companies because,
among other things, “investment managers who are compensated on the basis
of net asset value or performance may be unduly compensated.” Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” Investment Co. Act Release No. 5847, Accounting Series Release No. 113, [1937–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) ¶ 72,135 (Oct. 21, 1969) [hereinafter Statement Regarding “Restricted
Securities”]. For a discussion of the context of ASR 113, which was focused on
concerns of valuation practices in mutual funds, see Janet K. Smith, et al., The
SEC’s “Fair Value” Standard for Mutual Fund Investment in Restricted Shares
and Other Illiquid Securities, 6 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 421, 426–28 (2001);
see also David W. Grim, Deputy Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., U.S. Sec. and Exch.
Comm’n, Remarks to the Investment Management Institute 2013 (Mar. 7,
2013) (transcript available at https://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech
/1365171515032) [https://perma.cc/68LT-TX9W] (prepared by Norm Champ, Dir.,
Div. of Inv. Mgmt.). Besides overpaying the adviser, overvaluation of portfolio
assets can have dilutive effects on the investors in the fund. In this scenario a
shareholder that redeems would reap a windfall at the expense of shareholders
who remained in the fund. Craig S. Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, 1999 WL
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issues, the federal securities laws and the Commission have adopted
a process-driven approach to scrutinize valuations of hard-tovalue securities.3
The federal securities laws have attempted to address the conflict of interest inherent in a manager’s valuation of investment
assets particularly for registered investment companies that are
subject to the Investment Company Act of 1940 (“Investment Company Act”).4 The statutes and rules of the Investment Company
Act relating to valuation focus on general standards and procedures for valuation rather than issuing specific valuation guidelines for hard-to-value securities.5 Separate from these statutes
and rules, the Commission has provided guidance to registered
investment companies in applying the valuation standards in the
Investment Company Act to hard-to-value securities.6
In addition, more limited regulation exists for investment advisers registered under the Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (“Advisers Act”)7 who manage private funds. The Advisers Act provisions
take the form of specific requirements that may influence an adviser’s valuation, such as a requirement for annual audited financial
35020116, 5 n.4 (Dec. 8, 1999), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/guid
ance/tyle120899.htm [https://perma.cc/G734-YN7Z] [hereinafter Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter].
3 See Investment Company Act of 1940 § 15(c), 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2015);
see also In re Kornitzer Capital Mgmt. Inc., Investment Company Act Release No.
31,560, 2015 WL 1800393 (Apr. 21, 2015); In re Chariot Advisors, LLC, Exchange
Act Release No. 72,541, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3872, Investment
Company Act Release No. 31,149, 2014 WL 2986899 at *3 (July 3, 2014).
4 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80-a(1)(b)(5) (2012) (stating “it is declared that the
national public interest and the interest of investors are adversely affected ...
when investment companies ... in computing their earnings and the asset value
of their outstanding securities, employ unsound or misleading methods, or are
not subjected to adequate independent scrutiny”).
5 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(a)(41); Rules and Regulations, Investment
Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-1-2 (2015); id. § 270.2a-4; Smith et
al., supra note 2, at 422–23.
6 See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra note 2; see also Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies, Investment Company Act Release No. 6295, Accounting Series Release No. 118,
[1937–1982 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶ 72,140 (Dec. 23, 1970) [hereinafter Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies].
7 See Applicability of the Investment Advisers Act to Financial Planners,
Pension Consultants, and Other Persons Who Provide Investment Advisory
Services as a Component of Other Financial Services, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 1092 (Oct. 8, 1987).
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statements or a surprise inspection that invariably touches on a
fund’s valuation.8 In addition to specific requirements, the Advisers
Act also contains general antifraud provisions, including one that
focuses on an adviser’s fiduciary obligations to a client.9 Depending on an adviser’s conduct, these provisions may reach an adviser’s valuation.
For valuation disputes involving investors of private funds, the
aggrieved investors are left to rely on the courts’ interpretation of
the federal securities antifraud statutes.10 While these provisions
are well suited to address situations of overtly fraudulent conduct,
such as Ponzi schemes, they often fail to extend to situations when
advisers utilize problematic valuation methodologies.11 Courts have
been reticent to extend antifraud concepts to an investment manager’s valuation, setting significant barriers for plaintiffs to prevail,
particularly for private fund investors in these situations.12 Courts
have treated valuations largely as opinions rather than statements of fact.13 The implication of these cases is that a manager’s
valuation—while completely inaccurate—may remain impervious
to legal scrutiny. In many respects, the court’s treatment of the
subject is better understood as an extension of the business judgment rule and the dilemma of having courts interject their views
of value in a potentially complicated situation. 14 Despite these
challenges, a better approach could be developed to afford courts
a process-driven review of an adviser’s valuation procedures that
is more aligned with the Commission’s approach.
See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (clarifying that audit and surprise inspection
provisions extend to advisers who maintain custody of the securities); see also
id. § 275.206(4)-2(d)(2) (stating that custody is interpreted broadly to include
“having any authority to obtain possession” of client funds or securities).
9 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6 (2012).
10 Private litigants often rely on the antifraud provisions in the Securities
Act of 1933 (“Securities Act”) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”), particularly Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 77q–r,
§ 78j; 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
11 See, e.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 108–11 (2d Cir. 2011);
In re Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 311–12 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); Omaha Civilian Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., 679 F.3d 64, 67–69 (2d
Cir. 2012).
12 See Wendy Gerwick Couture, Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73
LA. L. REV. 381, 381–94 (2013).
13 Id.
14 Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Business Judgment Rule as Abstention Doctrine, 57 VAND. L. REV. 83, 87–90 (2004).
8
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This Article explores the regulatory and legal framework for
fund valuations of securities and concludes that the current approach inadequately protects investors. In Section I of this Article,
I discuss the Investment Company Act and Advisers Act provisions that govern valuation, particularly as it relates to the concept of fair value. This section also surveys settled administrative
proceedings brought by the Commission involving valuation related claims against registered funds. Section II provides a survey
of case law addressing valuation issues with a focus on private
funds. In Section III, I discuss the limitations of the current approach in the case law and suggest possible alternatives for addressing valuation disputes.
I. THE INVESTMENT COMPANY ACT AND ADVISERS ACT
The legal framework for valuation issues in the federal securities laws is primarily in the Investment Company Act and the
Advisers Act.15 The Investment Company Act’s provisions are designed to provide specific guidance to the valuation of registered
funds’ assets when those securities are easy to value. 16 A fund
with a security that has a readily available market price must
adopt that price in its valuation.17 The Investment Company Act
further dictates the timing of market quotations of a registered
investment company’s securities that assures that the valuation
Other statutes, rules, and regulations sometimes become relevant to the
valuation of assets in investment vehicles. For example, a public holding company that controls an investment adviser may have reporting and other obligations under the Exchange Act. See, e.g., In re GLG Partners, Inc., Exchange Act
Release No. 71050, 107 SEC Docket 4573, 4574 (Dec. 12, 2013) (settled matter)
(finding adviser’s overvaluation of assets in an investment portfolio also distorted filings of parent, a public company, leading to violations of Sections
13(b)(2)(B) and 13(b)(1)(A) and Rules 13a-1, a-11, and a-13 of the Exchange
Act); In re KCAP Fin., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 68,307, 105 SEC Docket
207, 207–08 (Nov. 28, 2012) (settled matter) (holding that a business development company failed to follow relevant accounting rules in valuation of assets
violating Exchange Act provisions); see also Complaint at 1–6, SEC v. Brantley
Cap. Mgmt., LLC, No. 1:09-CV-01906 (N.D. Ohio Aug. 13, 2009), [https://perma
.cc/YCT5-PLH6]; SEC v. Brantley Cap. Mgmt., LLC, Litig. Release No. 21,178,
96 SEC Docket 1823, 1824 (Aug. 13, 2009) (describing settlement with listed
business development company whose adviser affiliate misvalued portfolio assets, violating Exchange Act provisions).
16 See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(41) (2012).
17 Id.
15
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of the underlying securities held by the registered investment
company is timely. 18 However, for hard-to-value securities, the
Investment Company Act relies on broader principles. The fund’s
board is charged with a good faith obligation to value such assets
and to develop policies and procedures for such valuations. 19
Other provisions of the Investment Company Act require the investment company to disclose its valuation practices.20 Securities
enforcement matters against registered funds involving hard-tovalue securities have tended to focus on situations where an abuse
of the fund’s stated valuation policies and procedures occurred.21
While more technical violations of the Investment Company Act
are sometimes implicated in these cases, they typically involve
some aspect of fraud, either on the part of the adviser’s employees
or, less frequently, the board itself.22
The Advisers Act’s provisions have varying applications. The
antifraud provisions in the Advisers Act, for example, apply to all
investment advisers, regardless of whether they are registered.23
For registered advisers, all of the Advisers Act provisions reach
advisers to both registered investment companies and private
funds.24 These provisions do not specifically touch the issue of asset valuation. However, various provisions, such as the antifraud
provisions, prohibit advisers from making misleading statements
18 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1 (2015) (stating Rule 22c-1 of the Investment
Company Act requires a minimum daily valuation).
19 See Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, supra note 2, at 3–5.
20 See Craig S. Tyle, SEC No-Action Letter, 2001 WL 436249 (Apr. 30, 2001),
[https://perma.cc/V5AP-64KA] [hereinafter Tyle, SEC No-Action Letter].
21 See In re UBS Global Asset Mgmt. (Americas), Inc., Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 3356, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,920, 102 SEC
Docket 3075, 3078 (Jan. 17, 2012); see also In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc.,
Securities Act Release No. 9116, Exchange Act Release No. 61,856, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3009, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,203,
98 SEC Docket 455, 456 (Apr. 7, 2010).
22 See supra note 21.
23 See supra note 7; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 80b-6(1-2), (4) (2012); 17 U.S.C.
275.206(4)-8 (2012) (Sections 206(1-2), (4), and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Advisers
Act). Other antifraud provision rules promulgated under Section 206(4) apply
only to registered advisers. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. §§ 275.206(4)-1, -2 (2012) (note
that none of these provisions, including Rule 206(4)-1 and Rule 206(4)-2, are
available to private litigants).
24 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-2(a)(11) (clarifying that the investment adviser definition includes advisers to companies and private funds).
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concerning a fund’s asset valuation.25 Other provisions set minimum disclosure standards for private funds that influence valuations in the fund’s portfolio. For example, the custody rule may
require private funds to issue audited financial statements if certain conditions are met.26 However, the Advisers Act provides no
explicit obligations regarding valuation or the process utilized to
value any securities in the portfolio.27 As a result, enforcement
actions against private funds under the Advisers Act have focused
invariably on fraudulent conduct, such as an adviser’s affirmative
knowledge that a fund’s assets were intentionally mispriced.28
A. The Investment Company Act and Fair Value
1. Statutory Framework and Guidance
The Investment Company Act ultimately places responsibility
for valuation determinations on the board of directors of the fund.
The board is required to develop policies and procedures that comply with the Investment Company Act’s valuation provisions. 29
The primary provision governing valuation requires that, for a security with “readily available” market quotations, the fund is generally obligated to utilize the market quotation to value the
security. 30 Alternatively, for “other securities and assets,” the
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; see also 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6; see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2 (2015) (Section
206(4) and Rule 206(4)-2 of the Advisers Act).
27 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(b)(3)(D) (While this section of the Advisers Act requires that an investment adviser maintain valuation policies and practices of
the fund, it does not specify what those policies and procedures should be); see
also 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(2).
28 See, e.g., In re John Thomas Cap. Mgmt. Gr. LLC, Securities Act Release
No. 9396, Exchange Act Release No. 69,208, Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 3571, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,435, 105 SEC Docket 4051,
4051–55 (Mar. 22, 2013); Advisers Act Release No. 3571, 2013 WL 1180836
(Order Instituting Proceedings, filed Mar. 22, 2013) (partially settled matter,
litigation ongoing).
29 See Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, supra note 2, at 3–5.
30 Section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Investment Company Act provides one exception to utilizing market prices to value portfolio assets. Money market funds
may deviate from this requirement and instead use amortized cost under certain circumstances. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(41)(B). However, under Rule 2a-7, the
Commission will scrutinize the use of fair value pricing if it is used to prop up
or otherwise manipulate asset values. 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-7; see also In re John
25

26
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fund’s board of directors determines “fair value” in “good faith.”31
Although the Investment Company Act appears to create two categories of securities relevant to valuation analysis, a fund’s obligation to utilize fair value may include securities that typically
have readily available quotations. For example, fair value may be
appropriate for a widely traded foreign security if the foreign exchange on which it is traded is closed because of a scheduled market holiday and a value is needed for that date.32 In addition, the
fair value approach is often necessary for alternative mutual funds
that hold hard-to-value securities.33

E. Backlund, et. al, Securities Act Release No. 7626, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 1783, Investment Company Act Release No. 23,639, 68 SEC
Docket 2663, 2665 (Jan. 11, 1999).
Additional provisions in the Investment Company Act touch on valuation
considerations relevant to the valuation of the fund’s shares. Rule 2a-4(a)(2)
requires open-end mutual funds to reflect changes in its portfolio holdings no
later than in the first calculation one business day following the trade date. 17
C.F.R. § 270.2a-4(a)(2). Rule 2a-4(a) defines “current net asset value” for shares
issued by an open-end mutual fund. Id. § 270.2a-4(a). Rule 22c-1(a) states that
a computation of the valuation of open-end mutual fund shares must be computed to reflect current net asset value after the receipt of a purchase or sale
order. Id. § 270.22c-1(a). Rule 22c-1(b) specifies that an open-end mutual fund’s net
asset value must be calculated at least daily. Id. § 270.22c-1(b). Under § 23(b),
closed-end mutual funds are not permitted to issue stock at prices below net
asset value. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-23(b).
31 See the definition of “Value” under Section 2(a)(41)(B) of the Investment
Company Act. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(41)(B).
32 See MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS FORUM, REPORT OF THE MUTUAL FUND DIRECTORS FORUM: PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR FUND DIRECTORS ON VALUATION
OVERSIGHT 3 (2012), http://www.mfdf.org/images/Newsroom/Valuation-web.pdf
[http://perma.cc/5BGF-TD3T] (providing the example described, as well as
other situations when an exchange-traded security might require fair value
treatment).
33 Until recently, the alternative mutual fund space was the fastest growing
area in asset management. See Deidre Brennan, Will Liquid Alts’ Performance
Sustain Future Asset Flows?, FINALTERNATIVES 1 (Aug. 25, 2014) http://www
.finalternatives.com/node/28088/print [http://perma.cc/7RYB-C9LW] (noting
that although the segment made up 1 percent of the mutual fund industry (approximately $154 billion in assets under management), the segment grew by
43 percent in 2013). However, growth in the space has slowed considerably,
and a growing number of funds have liquidated. See Joe Morris, Liquidations
Signal Turning Point for Alts, IGNITES (Dec. 31, 2015). For valuation considerations related to these funds, see Norm Champ, Dir., Div. of Inv. Mgmt., Remarks to the Practising Law Institute, Private Equity Forum, (June 30, 2014),
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The Commission provided guidance on the fair value and good
faith concepts as they related to illiquid and hard-to-value securities
over forty years ago in two releases.34 The first release, issued in
1969, discussed situations when a fund board’s approval of a valuation technique would fall short of good faith.35 For example, in discussing the valuation of restricted securities,36 the Commission
stated that it was improper to fix the valuation at the market price
or at a preset percentage discount from free trading securities of the
same issuer, cost, or an amortization formula for various reasons.37
The theme of the Commission’s 1969 release was that there is “no
automatic formula” to apply to such securities and that fund boards
were obliged to continuously review restricted stocks “individually.”38
One year later, the Commission issued additional guidance.
The 1970 release emphasized that there was no single standard
for determining which “fair value ... in good faith can be laid down
since fair value depends on the circumstances of each individual
case.”39 The Commission defined fair value as a value based on
“the amount which the owner might reasonably expect to receive
for them upon their current sale.” 40 Rather than setting out a
methodology for determining fair value in good faith, the 1970 release provides a number of relevant factors a fund board may consider in conducting a good faith valuation. Although not purporting
(transcript available at http://www.sec.gov/News/Speech/Detail/Speech/13705
42253660) [http://perma.cc/S84V-X25J].
34 See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra note 2, ¶ 72,135;
see also Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies, supra note 6, ¶ 72,140.
35 See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra note 2, ¶ 72,135.
36 A party holding restricted stock is subject to limits on how or when the shares
can be disposed. For example, Rule 144 of the Securities Act places a holding
period and other restrictions on certain stock. Such stock is typically viewed as
worth less than free trading stock in a variety of contexts. See, e.g., John D.
Finnerty, The Impact of Stock Transfer Restrictions on the Private Placement
Discount, 42 FIN. MGMT. 575, 575–609 (2013); Daniel R. Van Vleet & Frank D.
Gerber, Valuing Restricted Stocks Issued in Acquisitions, 35 MERGERS & ACQUISITIONS 36, 36–39 (2000).
37 See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra note 2, ¶ 72,135.
38 Id. at 5.
39 See Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies, supra note 6, ¶ 72,140.
40 Id. Some commenters have criticized fixing fair value on a current sale
price because investors and the adviser may view the security on the basis of
a future anticipated return. See, e.g., Smith et al., supra note 2, at 426.

2016]

OUTSIDE A BLACK BOX

11

to be exhaustive, the factors for equity securities include fundamental analytical data relating to the investment, analyst reports,
size of the holding, recent transactions, merger proposals or tender
offers, and equities trading activity in comparable enterprises.41
Commission staff has periodically reiterated the Commission’s
guidance over a board’s good faith obligation in making a fair
value determination.42 In the recent money market fund reforms
implemented by the Commission in 2014, the Commission provided
added guidance concerning the use of pricing services to obtain
valuations of hard-to-value securities.43 Although the use of such
services is permissible, the board “may want to consider the inputs,
methods, models, and assumptions used by the pricing service to
determine its evaluated prices, and how those inputs, methods,
models, and assumptions are affected (if at all) as market conditions change” before relying on those valuations.44 The Commission outlined other considerations, such as “the quality of the
evaluated prices provided by the service” and the proximity of
time of the valuations to the time the fund calculates a net asset
value.45 The guidance also questioned “the appropriateness of using evaluated prices provided by pricing services as the fair values of the fund’s portfolio securities” if “the fund’s board of
directors does not have a good faith basis for believing that the
pricing service’s pricing methodologies produce evaluated prices
that reflect what the fund could reasonably expect to obtain for the
securities in a current sale under current market conditions.”46
See Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies, supra note 6, ¶ 72,140.
42 See, e.g., Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, supra note 2, at 7; Tyle, SEC NoAction Letter, supra note 20, at 8. (While noting that there is “no single standard”
for determining fair value in good faith, “a board acts in good faith when its
fair value determination is the result of a sincere and honest assessment of the
amount that the fund might reasonably expect to receive for a security upon
its current sale, based upon all of the appropriate factors that are available to
the fund.”). The Commission has also recently reiterated many of these basic
principles in discussing its reforms to money market funds. See Money Market
Reform; Amendments to Form PF, 79 Fed. Reg. 47,736, 47,814 (Aug. 14, 2014)
[hereinafter Money Market Reform]. The Commission was explicit that its discussion of valuation covered all registered investment companies. See id. at
47,812, n.873.
43 See Money Market Reform, supra note 42, at 47,813.
44 Id. at 47,814.
45 Id.
46 Id. at 47,815.
41
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U.S. Generally Accepted Accounting Principles (“U.S. GAAP”),
which are often used by U.S. firms, provide further guidance on fair
value, but do not formally distinguish between the two categories
valuation set out in the Investment Company Act.47 Instead, all
securities are valued as “fair value” which is defined as an “exit
price”—a “price at which an orderly transaction to sell the asset
or to transfer the liability would take place between market participants at the measurement date under current market conditions.”48 U.S. GAAP identifies two general categories of possible
inputs that may be relevant to valuing an asset. The first category, observable inputs, relies on existing market data that may
be relevant to valuing the asset.49 There is a further distinction
in the treatment of observable inputs.50 Publicly traded securities
with large trading volumes often have market quotations that are
an observable input.51 U.S. GAAP treats a valuation that is derived from such unadjusted market quotations of the same asset
as a Level 1 input.52 For securities lacking market transactions,
market prices for similar assets are an example of an observable
47 Although not explored in this Article, accountants also face liability concerning the audit of a fund’s financial statements. Potential liability extends
to an accountant’s failure to follow proper accounting principles in the valuation
of a security. The consequences for accountants who fail to follow applicable
accounting guidance includes being barred from practicing before the Commission. See, e.g., In re Lawrence A. Stoler, Securities Act Release No. 8726, Exchange Act Release No. 54,246, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2539, 88
SEC Docket 1647, 1652 (July 31, 2006) (settled matter).
48 FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., ACCOUNTING STANDARDS UPDATE:
FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT (TOPIC 820) 820-10-05-1B (May 2011), https://asc
.fasb.org/imageRoot/00/7534500.pdf [http://perma.cc/Q587-SSGT] [hereinafter
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS]. International Financial Reporting
Standards (“IFRS”), which is utilized by many funds domiciled in foreign jurisdictions, has a similar definition for fair value. See IFRS FOUNDATION, ILLUSTRATIVE EXAMPLES TO ACCOMPANY IFRS 13 FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT 6 (Dec.
2012), http://www.ifrs.org/use-around-the-world/education/fvm/documents/educa
tionfairvaluemeasurement.pdf [http://perma.cc/3JXH-ZFHC]. However, the two
accounting regimes have varying approaches to the measurement of fair value.
See, e.g., FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS BD., supra at 7–8.
49 See KPMG, FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENT: QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS 36
(Nov. 2013), http://www.kpmg.com/Global/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPubli
cations/IFRS-Practice-Issues/Documents/fair-value-qa.pdf [https://perma.cc/UV
Z4-B9AW].
50 See, e.g., id. at 3.
51 Id. at 107.
52 Id. at 36.
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input.53 U.S. GAAP treats the use of market quotations of similar
assets as a Level 2 input.54
Unobservable inputs—the second category—reflects the use of
assumptions that market participants may use to value the asset.55
However, U.S. GAAP requires these assumptions be based on the
best information available. 56 U.S. GAAP describes this form of
valuation as a Level 3 input.57 Because of the inherent subjectivity
of unobservable inputs, observable inputs are preferred when
they are available.58 However, they may not be available for many
types of assets, including distressed debt, bespoke derivatives, or
private equity investments.59
Boards may delegate aspects of the valuation function to other
parties. Funds often retain third party valuation services to value
fund securities and may designate a valuation committee that
consists primarily of non-board members to oversee the valuation
functions of the fund. 60 Although the Commission allows these
forms of delegation, the ultimate responsibility for fund valuations
falls on the board.61
Id. at 43–44.
Id. at 5.
55 Id. at 22.
56 Id. at 23.
57 Id. at 36.
58 Id. at 46.
59 See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS FINANCIAL SERVICES, STATEMENT OF
FINANCIAL ACCOUNTING STANDARDS NO. 157—FAIR VALUE MEASUREMENTS 3,
http://www.pwc.com/bm/en/publication/assets/usgaap_08_04.pdf [https://perma
.cc/U5EP-7CZC].
60 MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, PRACTICAL GUIDANCE FOR FUND DIRECTORS
ON VALUATION OVERSIGHT 10 (2012), http://www.mfdf.org/images/Newsroom
/Valuation-web.pdf [https://perma.cc/HED4-8A85].
61 The Commission has repeatedly emphasized that boards cannot delegate
the ultimate responsibility for determining the fair value of fund assets. For
example, the Commission has stated:
[I]t is incumbent upon the Board of Directors to satisfy themselves
that all appropriate factors relevant to the value of securities for
which market quotations are not readily available have been
considered and to determine the method of arriving at the fair
value of each such security. To the extent considered necessary,
the board may appoint persons to assist them in the determination of such value, and to make the actual calculations pursuant to the board’s direction. The board must also, consistent
with this responsibility, continuously review the appropriateness
53
54
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The board’s obligations regarding valuation under the Investment Company Act are process-driven and relate to the development of sound valuation policies and procedures rather than a fund’s
estimate of value to any particular security. For example, Rule
38a-1 of the Investment Company Act requires each registered
fund to “[a]dopt and implement written policies and procedures
reasonably designed to prevent violation of the Federal Securities
Laws by the fund.”62 It is incumbent on the board to develop valuation policies and procedures that: (a) monitor the necessity of
using fair value prices and develop criteria to determine when
market quotations are not an appropriate value; (b) implement a
methodology to fair value assets in the fund; and (c) regularly review the valuation methodology of the fund and implement adjustments as needed.63 Fund boards are also required to review
the adequacy of the policies and procedures of service providers,
such as the adviser to the fund, principal underwriter, administrators and transfer agents.64
The threshold issue a board confronts is whether a market quotation is not an appropriate measure of the value of the security held
in the fund’s portfolio.65 Commission staff has explicitly stated that
boards should “carefully consider various indications of the validity and reliability of market quotations” for domestic securities. 66
of the method used in valuing each issue of security in the company’s portfolio. The directors must recognize their responsibilities
in this matter and whenever technical assistance is requested
from individuals who are not directors, the findings of such individuals must be carefully reviewed by the directors in order
to satisfy themselves that the resulting valuations are fair.
Accounting for Investment Securities by Registered Investment Companies,
supra note 6, ¶ 72,140; see also In re Seaboard Assoc., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 20,867, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,890, 30 SEC Docket
330, 334–35 (Apr. 16, 1984) (Commission Section 21(a) Report); In re Hammes,
et. al, Securities Act Release No. 8346, Investment Company Act Release No.
26,290, 81 SEC Docket 2467, 2472 (Dec. 11, 2003) (settled matter) (quoting In re
Hartl & Lipman, Securities Act Release No. 7031, Exchange Act 33,165, Investment Company Act Release No. 19,840, 55 SEC Docket 991, 994-94 (Nov. 8,
1993)); Tyle, SEC No-Action Letter supra note 20, at 8 n.23.
62 Rules and Regulations, Investment Company Act of 1940, 17 C.F.R.
§ 270.38a-1(2006) [hereinafter Rules and Regulations, Act of 1940].
63 Compliance Programs of Inv. Co. and Inv. Advisers, 68 Fed. Reg. 74,714,
74,718 (Dec. 24, 2003) (codified as 17 C.F.R. §§ 270, 275, 279).
64 See supra note 62 and accompanying text.
65 See KPMG, supra note 49, at 39.
66 Tyle, SEC No-Action Letter, supra note 20, at 3.
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A thin market for a security or widely varying quotations from
broker-dealers might be indicative of the need for fair value pricing. Funds, often with the assistance of third party pricing services,
identify triggering events that support using fair value pricing.67
Once such an event occurs, the fund’s board exercises its judgment
to determine whether using fair value is appropriate.68 The board
would then likely retain a third party to conduct the valuation.69
As noted, a fund’s board is required to adopt policies and procedures with respect to valuation.70 Fair value is likely a significant
aspect of these policies and procedures, which should include a
description of the methodology for a fair value determination.71
The adviser to the fund, who is responsible for managing the portfolio, will follow the methodology outlined in the procedures. The
methodology should contain a hierarchy of the source for a fair value
determination.72 The appropriate valuation source may be varied
based on the type of security to be valued.73 When implemented
properly, the procedures should demonstrate that the adviser is
consistently using fair value procedures across the fund’s portfolio.74
A fund board’s responsibility does not end with a one-time adoption of valuation policies and procedures—Commission staff has
stated that the board should “periodically review the appropriateness of the methods used to fair value price portfolio securities
and the quality of the prices obtained through these procedures,
and ... make changes when appropriate.”75 One aspect of this responsibility—monitoring—requires the board to determine what
MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, supra note 60, at 5. Funds often set a trigger
that is “a percentage of the daily change in the value of an index of domestic
securities between the time of the close of a foreign exchange and the close of
the NYSE.” Id.
68 Id.
69 Id.
70 See 68 Fed. Reg. 74,718.
71 Id.
72 See MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, supra note 60, at 5.
73 See id.
74 See id.
75 See Tyle, SEC Interpretive Letter, supra note 2, at 7. An older Commission 21(a) Report used stronger language, emphasizing the board’s continuous
review of valuation methods:
While the Commission recognizes the difficulties inherent in
the valuation of [such] interests, directors have an affirmative
67
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documentation is necessary to evaluate whether the investment
adviser is following the fund’s valuation policies and procedures.76
The Mutual Fund Directors Forum has outlined common board
best practices to address valuation issues. 77 Boards sometimes
appoint a member to act as a liaison to communicate with the valuation committee or other relevant parties on difficult valuation issues.78 During the monitoring process, the board may become apprised that a particular valuation policy or procedure is no longer
appropriate for a variety of reasons and, therefore may wish to consider revising its policies and procedures. Boards may also adopt
a more formalized approach, periodically conducting a review of all
valuation policies and procedures and obtaining the input of other
relevant parties—counsel, auditors, and other valuation experts.79
The review process sometimes also incorporates a risk-based analysis to determine the robustness of the fund’s valuation policies
and procedures under different scenarios.80
Although less relevant to the valuation process itself, the Investment Company Act also regulates the liquidity of open-end
mutual funds.81 The liquidity regulations, however, may have the
effect of reducing the amount of hard-to-value securities present
responsibility to keep informed of developments which materially affect those assets not having a readily ascertainable market value .... Consistent with this responsibility, the directors
of a registered investment company must continuously review
the appropriateness of the method used in valuing the asset
not having a readily ascertainable market value.
In re Seaboard Assoc., Inc., Exchange Act Release No. 20,867, Investment Company Act Release No. 13,890, 30 SEC Docket 330, 334–35 (Apr. 16, 1984).
76 Board monitoring of adviser valuations as well as maintaining adequate
documentation to support that oversight are derived from Rule 38a-1(a)(3) and
(d) of the Investment Company Act. See Rules and Regulations, Act of 1940,
supra note 62. Commission guidance has suggested continuous review of the
valuation policies. See Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” supra
note 2, ¶ 72,135. Further, the 1970 release notes that the information a board
considered in reaching a fair valuation determination “should be documented
in the minutes of the directors’ meeting and the supporting data retained for
the inspection of the company’s independent accountant.” Id.
77 See MUTUAL FUND DIRS. FORUM, supra note 60, at 2.
78 See id. at 6.
79 See id.
80 See id. at 6–8.
81 See generally Investment Company Act of 1940 § 22, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-22 (2012).
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in certain registered investment companies. For example, the Investment Company Act requires that such funds satisfy redemption requests within seven days of the request.82 Commission staff
have provided related guidance that open-end funds should not
hold more that 15 percent of the net assets in illiquid securities.83
And, the guidance defines an illiquid security as one that cannot
be disposed of in the ordinary course of business within seven
days at approximately the value of which the fund has valued the
investment on its books.84 Therefore, an important consideration
in assigning a value of a portfolio security is whether the open-end
fund can dispose of that asset within the seven-day timeframe.85
An analog concept that appears throughout the securities laws—
the concept of disclosure—is also relevant to fund valuations and
consistent with the process-driven approach toward valuation issues.86 The Investment Company Act requires fund transparency
of valuation policies in periodic filings.87 For example, open-end
mutual funds are required to file registration statements that include disclosures regarding the methodology to value securities in
the fund’s portfolio, the circumstances under which a fund may
use fair value rather than market quotations, and the effect on
the fund of using market quotations.88 There are similar requirements to disclose “the methods used in determining value of investments” of a fund in periodic financial statements.89 Failure to
accurately value the securities or follow a fund’s stated valuation
procedures can lead to violations of Section 34(b) of the Investment

Id. § 80a-22(e).
See Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, 57 Fed. Reg. 9828 (Mar. 20,
1992) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 239, 274). Some authors had historically
suggested that registered funds did not fully take advantage of holding illiquid
securities up to the 15 percent limit because of onerous fair value requirements.
See Smith et al., supra note 2, at 460–61. However, the growth of registered
funds pursuing liquid alternative strategies may undermine such a critique.
See Brennan, supra note 33.
84 See Revisions of Guidelines to Form N-1A, 57 Fed. Reg. at 9829.
85 Id.
86 See generally Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a (2012).
87 17 C.F.R. § 271.11A (1984).
88 Id. § 8(b). One disadvantage of these filings, however, is the possibility that
they may become stale if the board changes the fund’s valuation methodology.
89 See Special rules of general application to registered investment companies, 17 C.F.R. § 210.6-03(d) (1994).
82
83
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Company Act that prohibits funds from disclosing materially misleading information in any required Commission filing.90
2. Commission Enforcement Actions
Commission enforcement actions involving registered funds
for valuation issues unsurprisingly tend to focus on failures and
abuses of the fund’s valuation policies and procedures. These matters typically involve situations where the fund failed to follow its
stated valuation procedures.91 They largely occur in situations where
a fund’s portfolio is losing value and a portfolio manager attempts
to manipulate the fund’s valuation procedures to hide the losses.92
In many of these cases, the Commission does not charge the fund’s
board since it was deceived.93
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-33(b) (2012).
See, e.g., In re Equinox Fund Mgmt., LLC, Securities Act Release No. 10,004,
Exchange Act Release No. 76,927, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4315,
2016 WL 212680 (Jan. 19, 2016) (settled matter); In re UBS Global Asset Mgmt.
(Ams.) Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3356, Investment Company
Act Release No. 29,920, 102 SEC Docket 3075, 3076–78 (Jan. 17 2012) (settled
matter); In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., et al., Securities Act Release No. 9116,
Exchange Act Release No. 61,856, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3009,
Investment Company Act Release No. 29,203, 98 SEC Docket 455, 456 (Apr. 7,
2010) (settled matter); In re Piper Cap. Mgmt., Inc., et al., Securities Act Release No. 8276, Exchange Act Release No. 48,409, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2163, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,167, 80 SEC
Docket 2772, 2779, 2781 (Aug. 26, 2003) (settled matter); In re Kyle R. Kirkland, Securities Act Release No. 8019, Exchange Act Release No. 44,876, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 1982, Investment Company Act Release
No. 25,199, 75 SEC Docket 2242 (Sept. 28, 2001) (settled matter).
92 However, there are situations where an adviser may undervalue a portfolio.
For example, in Van Wagoner, a portfolio manager of a fund complex undervalued illiquid securities holdings. See In re Van Wagoner, Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 2281, Investment Company Act Release No. 26,579, 83 SEC
Docket 1955, 1957 (Aug. 26, 2004) (settled matter). The funds’ offering materials
disclosed that the funds would not acquire illiquid securities if the acquisition
raised any fund’s holdings of illiquid securities above 15 percent of the value of the
relevant fund. Id. In the settled matter, the Commission alleged that the portfolio manager wrote down the value of certain private securities holdings to
zero in order to acquire more private securities. Id. Although the offering materials stated that the funds would determine the fair value of such securities,
the portfolio manager failed to do so. Id. at 1959–60. The order stated that the
portfolio manager “failed to fair value the securities in good faith ... [and] failed to
follow the board’s fair valuation policies, which did not permit the write-down in
securities’ valuations in an effort to shrink the entire portfolio.” Id.
93 Id. at 1955, 1959, 1961.
90
91

2016]

OUTSIDE A BLACK BOX

19

The Morgan Asset Management,94 administrative proceeding
and related J. Kenneth Alderman95 proceeding represent recent matters that address the adviser’s role in accurately valuing hard-tovalue securities and the board’s role in setting appropriate policies
and procedures related to the valuation process. In Morgan Asset
Management, the Commission, focusing on a fund’s adviser, alleged that the adviser’s staff intentionally inflated the value of
certain illiquid securities in five funds. 96 The assets were subprime mortgage-backed bonds.97 The effect of the mispricing was
to understate the significant price declines those securities experienced and understate portfolio losses in the funds.98 In addition
to charging various violations of the antifraud statutes,99 the order
charged the respondents with failing to implement adequate policies and procedures related to valuation practices and for failing
to comply with the requirements in Rule 22c-1 of the Investment
Company Act, which requires funds to sell and redeem shares based
on current net asset values.100
The funds’ boards of directors delegated the valuation function
to the adviser, Morgan Asset Management, Inc. (“Morgan Asset”).101
Morgan Asset priced each portfolio’s securities, calculated a daily
net asset value for the fund and largely staffed the funds’ valuation committees.102 The funds’ prospectus detailed the valuation
See In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., 98 SEC Docket at 456 (Apr. 7, 2010). The
matter subsequently settled. See In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., Inc., Exchange
Act Release No. 64,720, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3218, Investment
Company Act Release No. 29,704, 2011 WL 2482883 (June 22, 2011).
95 See In re J. Kenneth Alderman, et al., Investment Company Act Release
No. 30,557, 106 SEC Docket 2376 (June 13, 2013) (settled matter).
96 See In re Morgan Asset Mgmt., 98 SEC Docket at 456, 459.
97 Id. at 456.
98 Id. at 456, 458.
99 The order cited violations of the general antifraud provisions in Section
17(a) of the Securities Act of 1933, Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act of 1934, and the advisory antifraud statutes of Sections 206(1) and
206(2) of the Advisers Act of 1940. Id. at 459. In addition, the order cited violations of Section 34(b) of the Investment Company Act of 1940, which prohibits misleading statements in certain filings. Id.
100 The order charged violations of policies and procedures provisions in
both the Investment Company Act (Rule 38a-1) and the Advisers Act under
Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-7. See id. at 459–60.
101 Id. at 456.
102 Id. at 456–57.
94
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process when market quotations were not available.103 In those
situations, fair value was determined through various factors including the use of “fundamental analytical data,” “an evaluation
of the forces which influence the market in which the securities are
purchased or sold,” and “events affecting the security.”104 The policies and procedures also required the funds’ valuation committees
to maintain documentation of the manner fair value was determined
for a security.105 In addition, to support the fair value, each committee was required to maintain the next reliable quote for the fair
valued security.106
The Commission alleged that Morgan Asset failed to comply
with the funds’ valuation policies and procedures in several respects. First, the funds’ valuation committees “left pricing decisions to lower level employees ... who did not have the training or
qualifications to make fair value pricing determinations.” 107 The
Commission also alleged that the valuation committees failed to review fair valuations of securities periodically, allowing them to be
carried in the portfolio at “stale values for many months at a
time.”108 The Commission’s main allegations revolved around the
activities of a portfolio manager of the funds. The manager provided
262 “price adjustments” to illiquid mortgage-backed securities that
were unsubstantiated and he was given too much discretion to select which broker-dealer quotes would be used to substantiate the
valuations or whether they were overridden entirely.109
The portfolio manager’s conduct was particularly egregious in
Morgan Asset. The Commission alleged that he had conversations
with one broker-dealer employee that was providing indicative
quotes for the illiquid securities to the funds’ auditor and Morgan
Asset’s accounting department. 110 The portfolio manager requested the employee increase the broker-dealer’s quotes as an
accommodation to avoid having to mark down the fair value of the
securities that the manager had assigned. 111 For example, the
Id. at 457.
Id. at 456.
105 Id.
106 See id.
107 Id. at 457.
108 Id. at 457–58.
109 Id. at 457.
110 Id. at 456, 458.
111 Id. at 458.
103
104
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portfolio manager had marked down a mortgage-backed security
from $78 to $72.112 A few days later, the broker-dealer’s trading
desk provided a value of the same security at $50.113 However, the
portfolio manager persuaded the broker-dealer employee to provide an “interim” quote of $65, substantially overstating the value
of the security.114 In other instances, the portfolio manager also
persuaded the broker-dealer not to provide the funds’ auditor and
Morgan Asset’s accounting department a quotation.115
In Alderman, which named eight directors as respondents, focused on the board’s role in setting appropriate policies and procedures to value portfolio securities for the funds Morgan Asset
advised.116 The settled action simply alleged a violation of Rule
38a-1 of the Investment Company Act.117 The Morgan Asset fund
complex invested heavily in below investment grade debt securities that required fair value pricing.118 In practice, the accounting
department of the adviser set fair values based on a sample of
indicative quotes from brokers.119 As these assets experienced an
abrupt decline in value, the portfolio manager overrode the valuations and smoothed the losses.120 For example, the portfolio manager “gradually reduce[d], over days or weeks, a bond to its current
proper valuation.” 121 As discussed previously, Morgan Asset’s conduct violated the policies and procedures in place for the funds.122
Although the fund complex had policies and procedures in
place, which cited commonly accepted factors to fair value securities, the administrative order alleged that they were inadequate
and created the conditions that permitted the flawed security values. 123 The policies and procedures did not provide a “meaningful
Id.
Id.
114 Id.
115 Id.
116 See In re Alderman, et al., Investment Company Act Release No. 30,557,
106 SEC Docket 2376, 3280–81 (June 13, 2013).
117 Id. at 2381.
118 Id. at 2376–77.
119 The administrative order emphasizes that the broker quotes were not
firm quotes—in other words, quotes of prices at which the broker would actually buy the securities rather than opinions of value. Id. at 2378.
120 Id. at 2378–79.
121 Id. at 2379.
122 See supra notes 107–15 and accompanying text.
123 Alderman, 106 SEC Docket at 2378.
112
113
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methodology or other specific direction on how to make fair value
determinations for specific portfolio assets or classes of assets.”124
In particular, the policies and procedures lacked guidance on how
to weigh each valuation factor.125 The policies and procedures also
failed to define critical terms in their valuation guidance, such as
what constitutes “fundamental analytical data” for valuation purposes, and there was no mechanism to further review potentially
stale fair values.126 Additionally, no directors were members of the
valuation committee, and the guidelines did not require the committee to report to the board the valuation methodology used to fair
value the securities.127 The order highlighted the board’s obligation to set such policies and procedures in situations where the
board does not directly make valuations itself:
In connection with determining fair values, the Directors did not
calculate the valuations themselves, and neither established clear
and specific valuation methodologies nor followed up their general guidance to review and approve the actual methodologies
used and the resulting valuations. Instead, they approved policies generally describing the factors to be considered but failed
to determine what was actually being done to implement those
policies. As a result, Fund Accounting implemented deficient
procedures, effectively allowing the Portfolio Manager to determine valuations without a reasonable basis. 128

Another strand of cases involves situations where the investment adviser and portfolio manager are confronted with information that raises doubts about the accuracy of the fund’s stated
asset valuations. These “red flag” cases often include other misconduct that raises some doubt on the accuracy of the adviser’s
valuation practices. For example, in Evergreen Investment Management Company, also a settled administrative action, the adviser allegedly failed to apprise the fund’s valuation committee of
negative information concerning certain mortgage-backed securities held in the fund.129
Id.
Id.
126 Id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 2381.
129 In re Evergreen Inv. Mgmt. Co., Exchange Act Release No. 60,059, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2888, Investment Company Act Release
No. 28,759, 96 SEC Docket 118 (June 8, 2009); see also In re Lisa B. Premo,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3355, Investment Company Act Release
124
125
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An example of a red flag occurred when the adviser learned that
the issuer of a portfolio security would no longer pay out cash flow
to the fund until a senior tranche of the security had been fully
repaid to other investors.130 The adviser failed to pass this information on to the valuation committee for some time.131 When the
committee learned about the situation, it marked down the value
of the security to zero, reducing the fund’s net asset value from
$9.05 to $8.95 per share.132 The change in net asset value (“NAV”)
was significant because the volatility of the fund was very low, fluctuating between $9.20 and $9.73 for the previous year.133
In another red flag cited in the administrative order, the adviser’s portfolio management team received a dealer quote, which
was substantially below the fund’s previous valuation of a security.134
A member of the team contacted the broker to determine whether
the quote was based on a “distressed” sale.135 If the transaction involved a distressed sale, the portfolio manager could arguably justify
overriding the dealer’s quote and maintaining a higher valuation
to the valuation committee.136 However, the broker informed the
portfolio management team that the security was “‘not coming from
a distressed seller, just one that wanted to get out.’”137 Nonetheless,
the portfolio management team misinformed the fund’s valuation
committee “that they believed the sale was distressed and did not
disclose the broker-dealer’s statement.”138 As a result, “at least in
part” of this misinformation, the valuation committee declined to
mark the security down, overriding the quote.139
Evergreen, however, is not purely a red flags case. The matter
also involved alleged selective disclosure of information, which
compounded the impact of the fund’s overvaluation.140 After some
time, the valuation committee of the fund decided to stop utilizing
No. 29,919, 2012 WL 1029026 (Jan. 17 2012) (settled matter involving related
charges against portfolio manager of Evergreen funds).
130 Evergreen, 96 SEC Docket at 121.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Id.
135 Id.
136 Id.
137 Id.
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 Id. at 123.
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price overrides.141 This action resulted in a series of downward
revisions of the prices of the portfolio securities.142 The revisions
were not simultaneous and, as the fund’s securities began to experience mark downs, the fund’s distributor recognized that it
would receive inquiries from clients and other interested parties.143
The distributor prepared talking points for such inquiries.144 The
talking points disclosed that the fund might continue to mark
down securities in the portfolio. 145 In addition to these talking
points, the fund’s distributor later contacted affiliated registered
representatives to inform them of the situation and suggested that
their clients could transfer their holdings to other funds in the
fund complex.146 These disclosures advantaged the investors who
received this material information since they now knew that the
fund likely faced additional downward revisions of NAV.147
Although less common, the Commission has brought other actions beside Alderman against fund boards.148 In Hammes, a settled
administrative action, the Commission alleged that two bond funds
that were overseen by a common board were fraudulently mispriced.149 The Commission’s action focused liability on a subset of
the funds’ board—the members of the funds’ audit committee.150
The Commission alleged that they “failed adequately to assure that
those bonds were priced at ‘fair value’ or adequately to monitor
and assure the bonds’ liquidity.”151 The order included charges of
Id. at 121.
Id. at 122.
143 Id.
144 Id.
145 Id.
146 Id.
147 Id. at 123.
148 See, e.g., In re Cornerstone Cap. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 2778, Investment Company Act Release No. 28,380, 94 SEC Docket
315 (Sept. 16, 2008) (settled matter); In re Hammes, Securities Act Release No.
8346; Investment Company Act Release No. 26,290, 81 SEC Docket 2467, 2468
(Dec. 11, 2003).
149 Hammes, 81 SEC Docket at 2468. A related case included charges against
the funds’ adviser, members of the pricing committee, and other employees of
the adviser. See In re Heartland Advisors, Inc., Securities Act Release No. 8884,
Exchange Act Release No. 57,206, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2698,
Investment Company Act Release No. 28,136, 92 SEC Docket 1306, 1306–07
(Jan. 25, 2008) (settled matter).
150 Hammes, 81 SEC Docket at 2468.
151 Id.
141
142
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the Securities Act’s antifraud provisions in Section 17(a)(2) and
17(a)(3).152 The charges were based on five types of conduct perpetrated by board members: (1) they failed to monitor the liquidity
of the securities to ensure the funds could meet shareholder redemptions; (2) they “passively rel[ied]” on valuation committee
valuations; (3) they failed to “review financial statements, reports,
contracts, and other documents relevant to the financial condition[s]” of a portfolio security; (4) they “failed to take adequate steps
to follow up on their requests for information” from the adviser;
and (5) they improperly applied a generic haircut to securities in
lieu of conducting a fair value estimation.153 In addition, the order
charged the board members with causing violations of Rule 22c-1(a)
of the Investment Company Act because the misvalued securities
were an inaccurate reflection the funds’ current NAV.154
The recitation of events in the Hammes order suggests the
board was extraordinarily inept at handling worsening conditions
at the funds.155 Taken in isolation, each board action may not have
amounted to a violation, but in its totality, the board’s course of
conduct was ample justification for charges. At various meetings
the board was notified that the funds’ portfolio of bonds was deteriorating.156 In one meeting, the board was informed that the funds
were having difficulty liquidating bonds to meet redemptions, relying heavily on the funds’ credit line to meet obligations.157 In
another meeting, the board was informed that one fund held 18
percent of its portfolio in illiquid bonds and the other fund held 6
percent.158 As the board received this negative information, they
requested a report from the adviser explaining any plans to work
out the bonds, as well as quarterly progress reports. 159 Despite
continued deteriorating conditions, the Commission noted that the
board failed to follow through on these requests since the adviser
never completed the reports.160
Id. at 2472.
Id. The order noted that the adviser also directly violated these statutes. Id.
154 Id. The order noted that the adviser perpetrated a direct violation of Rule
22c-1. Id.
155 Id.
156 Id. at 2469–71.
157 Id. at 2469.
158 Id.
159 Id. at 2470.
160 Id.
152
153
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Conditions for the bonds in the funds continued to worsen. The
funds struggled to meet redemption requests since many of the
bonds were illiquid.161 In order to address the situation, the adviser
sold some of the distressed bonds to another party.162 The transaction price, however, was below the valuation of the bonds in the
funds.163 In order to close the transaction, the president of the adviser personally guaranteed to the counterparty that it could
“put” the bonds back to an affiliate.164 The transaction provided
the counterparty with a guaranteed 20 percent annual return.165
After the transaction, the adviser marked down the bonds in the
portfolio further.166 These mark downs were still not reflective of
market conditions since the adviser “refused or failed to sell sufficient bonds held by the [f]unds to meet redemption requests, in
large part because [the adviser] refused to value and sell the [f]unds’
bonds at prices it could reasonably expect to receive in a current
sale of those bonds.”167
Four days after the transaction, the board found that well over
half of the funds’ remaining portfolios were illiquid.168 Despite advice from the board’s counsel that the securities should be assigned
fair value rather than utilizing a pricing service, the board failed
to instruct the pricing committee to fair value the bonds.169 The
following day, however, the pricing committee began the process
of re-pricing the bonds using fair value.170 The order noted prices
were not changed retroactively for the previous trading day. 171
However, once the board received the fair values provided by the
pricing committee, it applied uniform “haircuts” on the proposed
fair values. 172 The haircuts were applied “without determining
whether such a haircut was appropriate for each portfolio security” and the new values for the securities violated the board’s
Id. at 2471.
Id. at 2470.
163 Id.
164 Id.
165 Id.
166 Id. at 2470–71.
167 Id. at 2471.
168 Id.
169 Id.
170 Id.
171 Id.
172 Id.
161
162
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obligation to “fair value” securities when market quotations were
not available.173
Enforcement matters that squarely address an adviser’s methodology as falling outside the standards set in the Investment Company Act or Commission guidance are extremely rare. 174 The
Parnassus Investments matter, in which the Commission charged
the adviser and board members of the fund, is the most recent
matter, and represents, unsurprisingly, a fairly egregious fact
pattern.175 In Parnassus, the adviser managed an open-end mutual fund that followed a contrarian investment strategy.176 One
investment in the portfolio was a stock position in a financially
troubled company, Margaux.177 Margaux declared bankruptcy.178
Although the fund held Margaux common stock prior to the bankruptcy, the adviser concluded that Margaux was undervalued and
purchased more common stock as well as loaned an additional
$100,000 to the company.179 The adviser understood that the loan
had a conversion right, but the loan agreement did not contain
any such language, making the conversion right subject to approval by the bankruptcy court.180 Margaux’s financial problems
persisted and the company was delisted, ultimately becoming a
thinly traded over-the-counter stock. 181 After several setbacks,
the company ceased operations.182
Id. at 2472.
See Grim, supra note 2 (discussing review of methodologies depends on
the situation and circumstances).
175 In re Parnassus Invs., Accounting and Auditing Enforcement Release No.
1071, 67 SEC Docket 2013 (Sept. 3, 1998) (default order); In re Parnassus Invs.,
Exchange Act Release No. 40,534, 68 SEC Docket 364 (Oct. 8, 1998) (Notice
that Initial Decision Has Become Final). Besides the valuation component of Parnassus, the adviser’s conduct touched on other issues. The adviser invested outside its stated investment policy, limiting loans to repurchase agreements, by
extending a direct loan to a company in violation of Sections 13(a)(3) and 21(a)
of the Investment Company Act. In addition, the adviser’s soft dollar practices
violated Section 17(e)(1) of the Investment Company Act, as well as related
disclosure violations under Section 207 of the Advisers Act. See id. at 364–65.
176 Parnassus Invs., 67 SEC Docket at 2014.
177 Id. at 2014–15.
178 Id.
179 Id. at 2015.
180 Id.
181 Id. at 2016–17.
182 Id. at 2019.
173
174
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Beginning with the bankruptcy, the adviser in Parnassus took
steps, with the approval of the board, to value the Margaux holding
contrary to Rule 22c-1 of the Investment Company Act and the
Commission’s guidance in the Accounting Series Releases for
good faith valuation of a security. 183 First, the adviser valued the
loan as if it was converted to restricted stock and eventually added a
10 percent premium to the restricted shares.184 The administrative law judge cited ASR 113 and quoted Commission guidance
that restricted stock typically should hold a discount to free trading
stock “except for the most unusual circumstances.”185 The administrative law judge concluded a significant discount was appropriate
because, after the delisting, Margaux’s stock was thinly traded,
presenting significant liquidity concerns.186
Second, after the Margaux shares were delisted, the Parnassus
adviser began to fair value the fund’s common stock holdings.187
The adviser valued the securities based on Margaux being a potential
acquisition target.188 The administrative law judge observed that
the adviser and board did not identify any unusual circumstances
justifying a departure from discounting the restricted stock right.189
The judge also noted the adviser’s “valuation methodology clearly
accorded great weight to certain intangibles” including the firm’s
management, “innovative technology,” and relationship with its primary customer.190 Enforcement staff described the adviser’s fair
valuation approach as a “‘long-term sale of the company approach,’” inconsistent with seeking the current value of the holding
under Rule 22c-1.191
In concluding that the adviser’s approach overvalued the Margaux common stock holding, the administrative law judge drew
on the factors identified in ASR 118 for fund boards to consider in
reaching a fair value of a security.192 The judge concluded that the
Id. at 2022.
Id. at 2016.
185 Id. at 2021.
186 Id. at 2023.
187 Id. at 2016.
188 Id.
189 Id. at 2023.
190 Id. at 2024.
191 Id. at 2024–26 (quoting Commission’s allegation).
192 Id. at 2025.
183
184
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adviser and the board “ignored or failed to give adequate consideration to a number of the general and specific factors set forth in
ASR 118.” 193 The judge found, for example, that the valuation
failed to take into account the absence of firms interested in acquiring Margaux, the implications of Margaux’s delisting, the
firm’s financial statements, and trading prices.194 Because these
factors were not taken into account, the judge concluded that the
holding was not valued based on what the fund “could receive under
current, albeit unfavorable, conditions, but according to what the
[f]und might receive if the so-called ‘true’ value were realized upon
sale of the entire company or a controlling portion therein.”195
B. The Advisers Act and Valuation
1. Statutory Framework
The Advisers Act imposes general antifraud provisions on all
investment advisers.196 For situations involving an adviser’s inaccurate valuation of securities, Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act
is the most important of the antifraud provisions because scienter
is not an element to prove a violation; instead, it establishes a
fiduciary duty upon all investment advisers.197 The Supreme Court
articulated the fiduciary duty concept in SEC v. Capital Gains
Research Bureau, Inc.198 The Supreme Court drew on the purpose
of the federal securities laws “to substitute a philosophy of full

Id.
Id.
195 Id. at 2026.
196 General Information on the Regulation of Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC.
AND EXCH. COMM’N (Mar. 11, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment
/iaregulation/memoia.htm [https://perma.cc/DX48-MAXW].
197 Investment Advisers Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(2) (2012). Notably,
the Investment Company Act does not have an equivalent provision. However,
Section 36(a) of the Investment Company Act empowers the Commission to
seek relief against officers, directors, members of any advisory board, advisers,
investment advisers, depositors, or principal underwriters of a registered investment company for “any act or practice constituting a breach of fiduciary duty[.]”
15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(a). In addition, the Investment Company Act has provisions
for false filings by a registered investment company under Section 34(b), which
would apply to false valuations. 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b).
198 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
193
194
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disclosure for the philosophy of caveat emptor and thus to achieve
a high standard of business ethics in the securities industry.”199
Under the Court’s interpretation of Section 206(2) in Capital
Gains, the adviser, as a fiduciary to its client, is obligated to disclose potential conflicts of interest. As the Court explained:
An investor seeking the advice of a registered investment adviser
must, if the legislative purpose is to be served, be permitted to
evaluate ... overlapping motivations, through appropriate disclosure, in deciding whether an adviser is serving “two masters” or only one “especially ... if one of the masters happens to
be economic self-interest.”200

For violations of Section 206(2), the Commission is not required to show economic harm to investors201 or that the adviser
had scienter to defraud the client.202 The Commission has utilized
Section 206(2) in a variety of enforcement actions.203 The concept
has not been fully developed in enforcement actions involving valuation, although at least one action discussed in more detail in
Section I.B.2 alleged a Section 206(2) violation.204
Id. at 186 (italics in original).
Id. at 196 (citing U.S. v. Mississippi Valley Generating Co., 364 U.S. 520,
549 (1961)).
201 See, e.g., Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2003); SEC v.
Slocum, Gordon, & Co., 334 F. Supp. 2d 144, 149 (D.R.I. 2004); In re Fundamental Portfolio Advisors, Securities Act Release No. 33-8251, Exchange Act
Release No. 34-48; Investment Company Act Release No. 26,099; 80 SEC
Docket 1851, 1863 (July 15, 2003) (Commission decision).
202 Instead, courts have applied a test of simple negligence. See Capital
Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. at 195; SEC v. Steadman, 967 F.2d 636,
643 n.5 (D.C. Cir. 1992); SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43, 72 (D.D.C. 2005), aff’d
in part, SEC v. Washington Inv. Network, 475 F.3d 392 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
203 See, e.g., In re Transamerica Fin. Advisors, Inc., Exchange Act Release
No. 71850, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3808, 108 SEC Docket 2522
at 6 (Apr. 3, 2014) (miscalculation of client fees); In re Western Asset Mgmt.
Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3763, 108 SEC Docket 673 at 6
(Jan. 27, 2014) (failure to reimburse clients pursuant to internal policies); In
re Martin Currie Inc., Investment Company Act Release No. 30,062, Investment
Adviser Act Release No. 3404, 103 SEC Docket 2336, 2345–46 (May 6, 2012)
(discussing an adviser who directed one fund to transact with another fund for
the purpose of maintaining liquidity in the second fund); In re Palmer, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2757, 93 SEC Docket 2316, 2318 (July 23, 2008)
(unauthorized transfers from two private funds designed to satisfy margin calls
on a third fund).
204 See infra note 256 and accompanying text.
199
200
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Conceptually, an adviser’s fiduciary duty extends to its valuation policies. An adviser’s valuation presents potential conflicts of
interest wherein the adviser may have incentives to reach an attractive valuation to reap higher fees, or otherwise benefit itself, to
the detriment of the fund and the fund’s investors.205 For example,
an adviser that consistently selects a valuation methodology that is
higher than alternative methodologies could expose itself to a Section 206(2) violation if it did not disclose this conflict. To date, the
Commission has not taken this approach in enforcement actions, and
has instead focused on other factors discussed previously.206
The remaining antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act are
similar to the antifraud provisions in the Securities Act and Exchange Act.207 Section 206(1) prohibits advisers from employing
“any device, scheme or artifice to defraud any client or prospective
client[.]”208 Scienter is required to show a Section 206(1) violation.209
Because of the Commission’s interpretation of “client” over the
years, Section 206(1) is often utilized in situations where the adviser
serves clients in separately managed accounts. 210 In contrast,
At least one author has described valuation issues in the context of conflicts of interest in discussing adviser’s valuation policies over private funds.
See Ryan Sklar, Note, Hedges or Thickets: Protecting Investors from Hedge
Fund Managers’ Conflicts of Interest, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 3251, 3267–68 (2009).
206 See infra notes 243–46 and accompanying text in discussing the types of
theories the Commission has generally brought.
207 There are important differences in the basic elements of the Advisers Act
and Exchange Act provisions. Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange
Act, for example, require the fraudulent conduct be “in connection with” a purchase or sale of securities. 15 U.S.C. § 78(b) (2012); 17 C.F.R. § 240.01b-6
(2012). No such requirement is present for Section 206 violations. 15 U.S.C.
§ 80b-6.
208 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6(1).
209 See, e.g., Vernazza v. SEC, 327 F.3d 851, 859–60 (9th Cir. 2003); SEC v.
Steadman, 967 F.2d 636, 641 n.3 (D.C. Cir. 1992); Steadman v. SEC, 603 F.2d
1126, 1134 (5th Cir. 1979) aff’d on other grounds, 450 U.S. 91 (1981); SEC v.
EagleEye Mgmt., 975 F. Supp. 2d 151, 158 (D. Mass. 2013); SEC v. Treadway,
430 F. Supp. 2d 293, 338 (S.D.N.Y. 2006); SEC v. Bolla, 401 F. Supp. 2d 43, 66
(D.D.C. 2005).
210 Historically, a pooled investment vehicle was counted as one client rather than counting each investor in the vehicle as an individual client. See
Goldstein v. SEC, 451 F.3d 873, 880 (D.C. Cir. 2006). After the Goldstein decision, there was some doubt whether Sections 206(1) and 206(2) of the Advisers
Act applied to fraudulent conduct that harmed investors of pooled investment
vehicles. See, e.g., SEC v. Northshore Asset Mgmt. 2008 WL 1968299, at n.3
(S.D.N.Y. 2008). In contrast, the Commodity Futures Trade Commission has
205
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Section 206(4) and related Rule 206(4)-8 specifically address an
adviser’s fraudulent conduct in pooled investment vehicles. 211
Rule 206(4)-8 prohibits advisers from two general categories of conduct. The rule prohibits advisers from making “any untrue statement
of a material fact or to omit to state a material fact ....”212 It also
prohibits advisers from engaging in “any act, practice, or course
of business that is fraudulent, deceptive, or manipulative with respect to any investor or prospective investor[.]” 213 Like Section
206(2), these provisions have been utilized in a variety of contexts,
including cases that have a valuation component.214 However, unlike Section 206(2), these provisions tend to reach more overtly
fraudulent conduct because of the scienter element.
counted clients of commodity trading advisers by individual investor. See 7
U.S.C. § 6(m) (2010). Prior to the implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, advisers could avoid registration
when they managed funds on behalf of no more than fifteen clients where clients were interpreted to count a fund as one client. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(b)(3)
(2010). The legislation repealed this provision.
211 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8 (2015).
212 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(1).
213 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-8(a)(2).
214 The conduct in many of these cases meets the legal requirements of multiple antifraud provisions, including Section 206(2) of the Advisers Act. See, e.g.,
In re West Coast Asset Mgmt., Securities Act Release No. 33-9501, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3746, 107 SEC Docket 5599, 5600 (Dec. 23, 2015) (discussing misrepresentations to investor regarding prior redemption activity of
a fund triggered Sections 206(2), 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 violation in addition
to a Securities Act violation); In re F-Squared Investments, Inc., Investment
Company Act Release No. 31,393, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3988,
110 SEC Docket 2953 at 10 (Dec. 22, 2014) (misleading back-testing of performance data of adviser’s strategy included violations of Sections 206(1), 206(2),
206(4)-8, and Rule 206(4)-8 of the Advisers Act); In re Ambassador Cap. Mgmt.,
Initial Decision Release No. 672, 108 SEC Docket 2637 at 1 (Sept. 19, 2014) (discussing an adviser’s misleading statements to board regarding a fund’s exposure
to mortgage-backed securities violated Sections 206(1) and 206(2), among others);
In re Chariot Advisors, Exchange Act Release No. 72,541, Investment Company
Act Release No. 31,149, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3872, 108 SEC
Docket 930 at 9 (July 3, 2014) (discussing an adviser’s misrepresentations to
fund board regarding trading strategy violated Sections 206(2), 206(4) and Rule
206(4)-8 of the Advisers Act among others); In re Oppenheimer Funds, Securities
Act Release No. 33-9329, Exchange Act Release No. 34-67142, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,099, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3417, 103
SEC Docket 2830, 2834 (June 6, 2012) (Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)-8 violations among others); In re Quantek Asset Mgmt., Securities Act Release No.
33-9326, Investment Company Act Release No. 30,085, Investment Advisers Act
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Although the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act reach
all advisers, nearly all of the specific prohibitions and rules-based
provisions apply only to registered advisers or advisers required
to be registered.215 The threshold for adviser registration is based
primarily on the adviser’s assets under management.216 Once registered, advisers assume certain obligations under the Advisers Act,
which extend to their advisory activities over any individual clients, registered investment companies, or private funds under
management.217 Unlike the Investment Company Act, however,
these obligations are largely principles based regulations and touch
on valuation indirectly.
As a result, the provisions of the Advisers Act focus on disclosure,
with a particular emphasis on revealing conflicts of interest. Advisers are obligated to file Form ADV and a related brochure, which
are publicly available.218 Among other things, Form ADV requires
the advisor to state its regulatory assets under management,219
Release No. 3408, 103 SEC Docket 2677, 2683 (May 29, 2012) (concerning adviser of private fund misrepresentations of “skin in the game,” related party
transactions, and investment process triggering Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)8 violations among others).
215 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2)(B) (2012).
216 The Advisers Act currently requires advisers to register if they have at least
$100 million in assets under management. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a)(2)(B)(ii)(II).
The Advisers Act affords an exception to registration for advisers who manage
private funds and have U.S. assets under management of less than $150 million. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3(m)(1). Advisers below these thresholds must typically register with the states in which they operate. See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-3a(a).
A variety of advisers with less than $100 million may still register with the
Commission if they meet certain criteria. For example, advisers who provide services primarily through the Internet may register with Commission regardless
of their assets under management. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.203A-2(e).
217 Information for Newly-Registered Investment Advisers, U.S. SEC. AND
EXCH. COMM’N (Nov. 23, 2010), https://www.sec.gov/divisions/investment/adv
overview.htm [https://perma.cc/5VCH-AEUB].
218 15 U.S.C. § 80b-4(a).
219 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM ADV, UNIFORM APPLICATION FOR
INVESTMENT ADVISOR REGISTRATION AND REPORT BY EXEMPT REPORTING ADVISORS, pt. 1A, item 1, at 9–10, http://www.sec.gov/answers/formadv.htm [https://
perma.cc/UC39-LJLW] [hereinafter Form ADV]. Regulatory assets under management may vary substantially from an adviser’s actual assets under management because the definition excludes netting indebtedness or other accrued
but unpaid liabilities. In addition, if an adviser’s portfolio derives less than 50
percent of its value from securities, it is excluded. See id. at pt. 1A, instruction
5b, at 7.
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asset value in accounts held by the adviser,220 gross asset value of
any private fund; 221 and identify auditors 222 and third parties responsible for valuing any portfolio assets.223 Populating Form ADV
with incorrect information, such as inaccurate regulatory assets
under management, constitutes a separate violation from the antifraud provisions224 and does not require a showing of scienter.225
More generally, the Advisers Act also has provisions governing a
registered adviser’s advertising materials, which could touch on
valuation to the extent that performance is exaggerated because of
inflated asset values.226 Like misleading statements in the Form
ADV, such misstatements constitute a securities violation.227
Registered advisers are also required to complete Form PF for
private funds the adviser manages if it meets a certain dollar threshold.228 Form PF requires a more detailed description of the private
fund’s investments than is required in Form ADV. Many aspects
of Form PF require valuation information, such as: identifying the
investment style of the fund and the associated regulatory assets
under management and net assets under management;229 a breakdown of the U.S. GAAP valuation hierarchy of the private fund’s
See id. at pt. 1A, item 9, at 14.
See id. at sched. D, item 11, at 7.
222 See id. at sched. D, item 23, at 9.
223 See id. at sched. D, item 27, at 10. This item requires the adviser to identify the proportion of the assets under management that are valued by third
parties. Id.
224 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (2012).
225 See, e.g., SEC v. K.W. Brown and Co., 555 F. Supp. 2d 1275, 1309 (S.D. Fla.
2007); In re Fields, Securities Act Release No. 9727, Exchange Act Release No.
74,344, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,461, Investment Advisers Act
Release No. 4028, 2015 WL 728005 at *28 n.101 (Feb. 20, 2015); In re Montford
and Co., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3829, 2014 WL 10761140 at *27
(May 2, 2014); In re Knelman Asset Mgmt. Group, Investment Company Act
Release No. 30,766, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3705, 107 SEC Docket
2976, 2980 n.4 (Oct. 28, 2013) (settled matter); In re Warwick Capital Mgmt.,
Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2694, 92 SEC Docket 1137, 1144 (Jan. 16,
2008); In re Disraeli, 90 SEC Docket 385, 397 (March 5, 2007).
226 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-1 (2015).
227 See id.
228 In order for obligations to file Form PF to be triggered, the adviser must manage at least $150 million in private fund assets. See 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1(a).
229 See U.S. SEC. & EXCH. COMM’N, FORM PF, REPORTING FORM FOR INVESTMENT ADVISERS TO PRIVATE FUNDS AND CERTAIN COMMODITY POOL OPERATORS
AND COMMODITY TRADING ADVISORS, § 1a, item B, at 2–3, https://www.sec.gov/rules
/final/2011/ia-3308-formpf.pdf [https://perma.cc/7692-F68B].
220
221
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assets by asset class; 230 and fund performance information. 231
Certain large advisers must provide additional information. 232
Like Form ADV, if an adviser files an inaccurate Form PF, it is
subject to liability.233
Some Advisers Act provisions touch on portfolio valuation by
creating operational obligations. Rule 206(4)-2 requires that advisory
clients receive statements on at least a quarterly basis “identifying the amount of funds and of each security in the account at the
end of the period[.]”234 More significantly, the rule mandates that
certain advisers retain an accounting firm to conduct surprise examinations or issue financial statements on an annual basis.235
For example, an adviser managing a pooled investment vehicle
must obtain and distribute to investors an audited financial statement or subject itself to an annual surprise examination.236 These
activities require a third party, an accountant, to review the valuation of the securities held in the investment vehicle.237
Rule 206(4)-7 is another operational rule that touches on valuation. The rule requires the development of “written policies and
procedures reasonably designed to prevent violation” of the Advisers Act.238 Like the counterpart compliance rule for registered
investment companies,239 the rule does not enumerate specific elements that advisers should implement in their policies and procedures.240 However, the Commission’s adoption release for the rule
makes plain that the mandated policies and procedures should
address the adviser’s “[p]rocesses to value client holdings and
See id. § 1b, item B, at 5–6.
See id. § 1b, item C, at 7–8.
232 These additional disclosures are triggered by certain advisers who have
assets under management of $1.5 billion or more. See id. ¶ 3, at 2.
233 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-7 (2012); see also 17 C.F.R. § 275.203-1 (requiring
most investment adviser applicants to file Form ADV); 17 C.F.R. § 275.204(b)-1
(requiring certain investment advisers to submit Form PF).
234 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-2(a)(3).
235 See 17 C.F.R.§ 275.206(4)-2(a)(4).
236 See 17 C.F.R.§ 275.206(4)-2(b)(4).
237 See id.
238 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7(a).
239 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.38a-1(a)(2) (2006) (to the extent an adviser is providing services to a registered investment company, the company’s board reviews
the adviser’s policies and procedures to determine their robustness).
240 See 17 C.F.R. § 275.206(4)-7.
230
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assess fees based on those valuations[.]”241 One purpose in subjecting advisers to registration and to this compliance regime was
to address frauds that involved, among other things, “improper
valuation of assets.”242
2. Commission Administrative Actions
The Commission has brought several administrative actions
against advisers of private funds for Advisers Act violations. Enforcement cases rely primarily on violations of Section 206. The
fact patterns in these cases have varied widely and included situations where the adviser failed to follow the valuation procedures
represented to investors;243 the adviser misrepresented the portfolio despite contradicting authoritative evidence;244 the adviser’s
valuations were part of a larger effort to fraudulently inflate asset
values;245 and the adviser’s basis for a valuation was no longer
Compliance Programs of Investment Companies and Investment Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2204, 81 SEC Docket 2775, 2779
(Dec. 17, 2003).
242 Registration Under the Advisers Act of Certain Hedge Fund Advisers, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2333, 84 SEC Docket 1032, 1047 (Dec. 2, 2004).
243 See, e.g., In re Retirement Inv. Advisors, Inc., Exchange Act Release No.
76,218, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4237, 2015 WL 6352065 at *2
(Oct. 21, 2015) (settled matter); In re Lynn Tilton, Investment Company Act
Release No. 31,539, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4053, Accounting and
Auditing Enforcement Release No. 3644, 2015 WL 1407564 at *2 (Mar. 30,
2015) (proceeding ongoing); In re Oppenheimer Asset Mgmt., Inc., Securities
Act Release No. 33-9390, Investment Advisers Act Release No. IA-3566, 105
SEC Docket 3387, 3387–88 (Mar. 11, 2013) (settled matter).
244 See In re Leaddog Cap. Markets, LLC, Release No. 468, 104 SEC Docket
2604, 2608 (Sept. 14, 2012), aff’d, Release No. 68,205, 104 SEC Docket 3996,
3996 (Nov. 9, 2012). In Leaddog, the adviser of a private fund distributed a due
diligence questionnaire to a potential investor falsely claiming that the fund
held approximately 50 percent of its assets in illiquid investments. However,
the fund’s audited financial statements disclosed that the fund held a much
higher percentage—92 percent—of fund assets as illiquid. Id. at 2608.
245 See, e.g., In re Kuperman, Securities Act Release No. 10,009, Exchange
Act Release No. 76,991, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4323, Investment
Company Act Release No. 31,973, 2016 WL 336086 at 3–4 (Jan. 28, 2016),
https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2016/33-10009.pdf [https://perma.cc/KSF2
-YCMB], (settled matter) (regarding an adviser overvaluation of an illiquid penny
stock holding that comprised over 20 percent of the portfolio); In re Alphabridge
Cap. Mgmt., LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 4135, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,700, 2015 WL 3982040 at 2 (July 1, 2015), https://www
241
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valid.246 This last category of administrative cases—the adviser’s
basis for valuation—represent more unusual examples of scrutinizing an adviser’s valuation methodology.
The Oppenheimer settled matter provides a good illustration of an
adviser that allegedly failed to follow its valuation procedures.247
The adviser managed a private fund that invested in other funds—a
fund of funds.248 The pitch book describing the fund of funds disclosed that its assets were valued based on the prices provided by
the underlying managers of the funds. 249 The portfolio manager,
however, elected to discard the stated value of one underlying fund
and instead used a higher valuation.250 The deviation in values
.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ia-4135.pdf [https://perma.cc/NYF4-L65T] (settled matter) (involving a scheme to use manipulated broker quotes to prop up
securities valuation); In re John Thomas Cap. Mgmt. Grp. LLC, Initial Decision
Release No. 693, 2014 WL 5304908 at 19, (Oct. 17, 2014), https://www.sec.gov
/alj/aljdec/2014/id693cff.pdf [https://perma.cc/DW78-M98J], enforcing, Securities
Act Release No. 9396, 105 SEC Docket 4051, 4053–54 (Mar. 22, 2013) (partially
settled matter, litigation ongoing) (involving an adviser who used several manipulative devices, including a stock touter to manipulate the value of portfolio
stocks upward, and inconsistent valuations of the same securities across funds);
In re Oxford Inv. Partners, LLC, Investment Advisers Act Release No. 3553,
105 SEC Docket 2870, 2870, 2871 (Feb. 15, 2013) (settled matter) (involving
valuation derived from baseless projections of the adviser’s business in an effort to sell a stake in the adviser); In re Koch, Release No. 707, 103 SEC Docket
3339, 3340 (June 15, 2012), modifying, Release No. 458, 103 SEC Docket 2664,
2664 (May 24, 2012) (regarding an effort to mark the close, and also inflated,
net asset values of clients).
246 See, e.g., In re Bunzel, Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 67,140, Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 3416, Investment Company Act of 1940
Release No. 30,098, 103 SEC Docket 2941, 2942–43 (June 6, 2012) (settled matter); In re Cornerstone Cap. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 2855, 95 SEC Docket 1379, 1380 (Mar. 20, 2009) (settled matter); In
re Springer Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release No. 2434, 86
SEC Docket 803, 805 (Sept. 21, 2005) (settled matter). In one recent settled
matter, a third party administrator played a role in inappropriately valuing
private funds by failing to address recurring loans made by the adviser that
remained unpaid. See In re Apex Fund Servs. (US), Inc., Investment Advisers
Act Release No. 4429, 2016 WL 3345650 (June 16, 2016), https://www.sec.gov
/litigation/admin/2016/ia-4429.pdf [https://perma.cc/W4T2-G9BZ]. The settlement charged the administrator with causing the adviser’s violation of Sections
206(2) and 206(4) of the Advisers Act. Id.
247 See In re Oppenheimer Asset Mgmt., Inc., 105 SEC Docket at 3389.
248 Id. at 3387.
249 Id. at 3388.
250 Id. at 3389.
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caused “a material increase in the value ... and ... performance” of the
fund of funds.251
While the portfolio manager’s work group modified the performance table in the pitch book, they failed to revise the valuation
disclosure or to submit the revised pitch book to the adviser’s compliance department.252 According to the administrative order, “[d]uring their marketing efforts, the [p]ortfolio [m]anager and others in
his group touted the performance of [the underlying fund and the
fund of funds] to prospective investors[.]”253 The employees made
other misrepresentations concerning the investment as well, such
as making claims that the underlying fund was audited and the
increased value was a reflection of the underlying fund’s performance.254 In addition to violations of Section 206(4) and related
Rule 206(4)-(8) of the Advisers Act, the parties agreed to settle on
charges of deficient policies and procedures and the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act.255
The Cornerstone Capital settled matter explored a situation
where the adviser allegedly refused to make downward adjustments of portfolio security valuations, despite being confronted
with adverse information that strongly suggested the securities
were impaired.256 The adviser managed client funds in separately
managed accounts.257 The settled order did not discuss the adviser’s valuation methodology on the accounts, focusing instead
on the headings in quarterly client statements that listed the
“market price” and “total market value” of the various investments the client held.258 The Commission Order suggests that the
adviser’s selection of investments was poor since many were ultimately fraudulent. 259 For example, the adviser invested client
funds in a currency exchange program that later was raided by
Costa Rican authorities.260 The authorities seized assets and froze
bank accounts, arrested one of the program’s promoters, and charged
Id.
Id.
253 Id.
254 Id. at 3390.
255 Id.
256 In re Cornerstone Cap. Mgmt., Inc., Investment Advisers Act Release
No. 2855, 95 SEC Docket 1379, 1380 (Mar. 20, 2009).
257 Id.
258 Id. at 1381.
259 See id. at 1380.
260 Id. at 1381.
251
252

2016]

OUTSIDE A BLACK BOX

39

him with fraud. 261 The adviser was aware of the arrest and
charges.262 In addition, the adviser read news reports, including
an article from The Wall Street Journal describing the program
“as a classic Ponzi scheme,” and learned that the program ceased
operations and ceased paying interest payments.263 Despite knowing
these issues, the adviser continued to send clients quarterly statements that showed the value of the investment in the program at
cost plus accrued interest. 264 Based on this example and other
similar scenarios, the parties settled to Section 206(1) and 206(2)
Advisers Act charges.265
In contrast to Cornerstone Capital, the Bunzel settled matter
addressed the adviser’s valuation methodology in two commonly
managed private funds that were structured as partnerships. 266
In Bunzel, the adviser, who was the general partner of both funds,
could set a value that he “may reasonably determine in good
faith.” 267 The Order focused on the adviser’s reasonableness in
setting a valuation and did not explore whether the adviser was
acting in good faith.268 In other words, the alleged violation came
about because of the unreasonableness of the valuation in light of
the factors that the adviser used to justify it.269
The funds’ largest investment was in a privately held registered
investment adviser that was first acquired in the 1990s.270 Over
time, the adviser adjusted the value of this investment upward based
on the price at which the firm bought or sold its shares in private
transactions. 271 In 2008, these adjustments grew dramatically;
the adviser raised the value of the holding by 88 percent as of

Id.
Id.
263 Id.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 1379–80, 1383.
266 See, e.g., In re Bunzel, Securities Exchange Act of 1934 Release No. 67,140,
Investment Advisers Act of 1940 Release No. 3416, Investment Company Act
of 1940 Release No. 30,098, 103 SEC Docket 2941, 2942–43 (June 6, 2012) (settled matter).
267 Id.
268 Id.
269 Id. at 2943.
270 Id. at 2942.
271 Id.
261
262
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August 2008.272 With this higher value, the holding comprised 76
percent of the total portfolio.273 The adviser relied on four reasons
for the increased valuation: (1) the portfolio firm had preliminary
discussions to repurchase shares for approximately the valuation
price; (2) the portfolio company’s assets under management grew
substantially during 2008; (3) the portfolio company’s revenues
were increasing substantially; and (4) the adviser attempted to
make comparisons to other large publicly traded companies in the
financial sector.274
However, by December 2008, all of these factors changed dramatically, and the Commission alleged “there was no reasonable
basis to support [the adviser’s] valuation” because the adviser’s
reasons that supported the valuation “no longer existed.”275 The
Order observes that the portfolio firm’s discussion to repurchase
shares had “ceased” by October 2008 and that its assets under
management and revenues decreased substantially from earlier
periods. 276 Further, “financial markets became extremely volatile—especially financial sector stocks.”277 Despite these adverse
events, the adviser failed to reduce its valuation of the investment
until 2010 when two valuation firms suggested the value of the
funds’ holdings in the firm were significantly lower.278 The parties
settled to charges of violations of Section 206(4) and Rule 206(4)(8) of the Advisers Act.279
II. THE COURT CASES AND THE ANTIFRAUD STATUTES
A. General Court Views on Valuations in Private Actions
Advisory clients and investors seeking redress from advisers
typically rely on the antifraud provisions of the Securities Act and
Id.
Id. at 2942–43.
274 Id. at 2943.
275 Id. (emphasis added).
276 Id.
277 Id.
278 Id.
279 Bunzel also involved other conduct not related to valuations. In particular,
the order also discussed the adviser’s failure to obtain audited financial statements and obtaining management fees in excess of those disclosed to the funds’
investors. See id. at 2943–44.
272
273
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Exchange Act. 280 Although the precise elements of these provisions vary, they are similar and somewhat analogous to the Section
206 provisions in the Advisers Act.281 The core theory of liability
for the Securities Exchange Act provisions is that an adviser’s inaccurate portfolio valuations may become material misstatements
of fact.282 Beside the typical hurdles in bringing a claim under
Section 17(a), Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5,283 courts have been
reluctant to entertain claims based on valuation.284
280 Private plaintiffs are largely foreclosed from relying on provisions of the
Investment Company Act and Advisers Act to bring a claim; however, private
litigants may allege various common law claims related to such situations. See,
e.g., Investment Company Act of 1940, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35 (2012). However,
such a theory would likely be difficult to prevail except in egregious cases. See,
e.g., Abu Dhabi Com. Bank v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 888 F. Supp. 2d 431, 440,
442, 444 (S.D.N.Y. 2012) (discussing a suit grounded in New York common law
alleging, among other things, fraudulent credit ratings that inflated the value
of certain mortgage-backed securities). Another indirect potential avenue for
private investors who participated in registered investment companies—which
may also be difficult—is to argue the adviser’s fee, as a result of valuation issues, was excessive. See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Associates, 559 U.S. 335, 346
(2010) (finding adviser’s fees must be “so disproportionately large that it bears
no reasonable relationship to the services rendered and could not have been
the product of arm’s length bargaining.”); see also Sivolella v. AXA Equitable
Life Ins. Co., Slip Op., 2016 WL 4487857 (Aug. 25, 2016).
281 See 15 U.S.C. § 80b-6a.
282 See 15 U.S.C. § 78r.
283 The antifraud provisions have a number of requirements that are necessary to satisfy a claim and to prevail successfully. These provisions require that
any alleged misstatements or omissions of facts be material; therefore, courts
have defined material facts as information for which there is a substantial likelihood that a reasonable investor would consider in making an investment decision. See, e.g., Basic Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 231–32, 238 (1988) (citing
SEC v. Tex. Gulf Sulphur Co., 401 F.2d 833, 862 (2d Cir. 1968)). For most provisions, courts also require the perpetrators of the fraud to have scienter—“a
mental state embracing intent to deceive, manipulate, or defraud.” Ernst &
Ernst v. Hochfelder, 425 U.S. 185, 194 (1976). More recently, the Supreme
Court has also placed additional requirements on who may be liable for making
such statements. See Janus Cap. Grp., Inc. v. First Derivative Traders, 564
U.S. 135, 144 (2011).
284 Private litigants also face additional judicial scrutiny because of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, 15 U.S.C. § 78u-4(b)(1) (2012)
(requiring securities fraud complaints to specify each misleading statement
and set forth the facts on which a belief that a statement is misleading was
formed). See, e.g., Pa. Pub. Sch. Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. Bank of Am., 974 F. Supp.
2d 341, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).
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Courts’ reluctance in accepting plaintiff theories related to
misvaluation of portfolio assets is grounded in views regarding
statements of value for purposes of the antifraud statutes. In analyzing statements for potential liability under Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5, courts have divided statements into two categories:
statements of fact and statements of opinion.285 The seminal case
in this area is Virginia Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg.286 In Virginia
Bankshares, a company’s board of directors provided its reasoning
for voting for a forced buyout of minority shareholders by disclosing
that the board thought the buyout price was attractive in a proxy
statement.287 The plaintiff, a minority shareholder, filed an action
alleging violations of Section 14(a) of the Exchange Act related to
misstatements in proxy solicitations. 288 The plaintiff contended
that the statement concerning the attractiveness of the buyout
price was untrue because it was not an attractive offer and the
board voted in favor of the resolution under pressure from the
majority shareholder. 289 The Supreme Court in Virginia Bankshares faced somewhat of a conundrum because the inquiry for a
statement of fact under Section 14(a)—as well as other antifraud
provisions—was whether the statement was untrue.290 However,
the board in Virginia Bankshares was expressing an opinion.291
The Court acknowledged that opinion statements can be misleading, but cabined the scope of review:
Attacks on the truth of directors’ statements of reasons or belief,
however, need carry no such threats. Such statements are factual
in two senses: as statements that the directors do act for the reasons given or hold the belief stated and as statements about the
subject matter of the reason or belief expressed .... Reasons for directors’ recommendations or statements of belief are ... characteristically matters of corporate record subject to documentation, to
be supported or attacked by evidence of historical fact outside a
plaintiff’s control. Such evidence would include not only corporate minutes and other statements of the directors themselves, but
circumstantial evidence bearing on the facts that would reasonably
underlie the reasons claimed and the honesty of any statement that
Va. Bankshares, Inc. v. Sandberg, 501 U.S. 1083, 1092 (1991).
See generally id.
287 Id. at 1084.
288 Id.
289 Id. at 1088–89.
290 Id. at 1086–87.
291 Id. at 1098.
285
286
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those reasons are the basis for a recommendation or other action, a
point that becomes especially clear when the reasons or beliefs go
to valuation in dollars and cents.292

With Virginia Bankshares as a guide, subsequent courts have
evaluated the contours of statements concerning valuations to delineate pure opinions from quantifiable and verifiable facts. In
some cases, courts conclude that the only area of liability in a statement is whether the speaker of the statement did not believe the
opinion uttered because the statement was ultimately subjective.293
For example, a number of cases have been brought by disgruntled
investors against public companies who allegedly misvalued mortgage-backed securities.294 The general fact pattern of these cases is
that the company held the asset on its balance sheet and failed to
mark down the value in a timely fashion as market conditions for
the security became adverse.295 The courts emphasized that the
securities were complex and reliant on pricing models, which required some element of judgment.296
Courts have been unreceptive of other fraud claims in situations
similar to an adviser’s efforts to fair-value securities in a fund. For
example, one strand of cases treating valuation as entirely subjective
and immune to most claims of fraud relates to situations where applicable accounting guidance provides wide latitude to the party
valuing the security.297 Further, in these situations, courts have
Id. at 1092–93.
See, e.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 111 (2d Cir. 2011).
294 Fulton Cty. Emps. Ret. Sys. v. MGIC Inv., 675 F.3d 1047, 1048 (7th Cir. 2012).
295 See Fait, 655 F.3d at 108; In re Barclays Bank PLC Sec. Litig., No. 09
Civ. 1989 (PAC), 2011 WL 31548, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 5, 2011).
296 See, e.g., Fait, 655 F.3d at 110–11 (plaintiff could not provide an objective
standard for the price of the securities); Fulton Cty., 2010 WL 5095294, at *5,
10, 12 (The valuation required “technical concepts” and “there was no single value
that could have been applied ... and deemed the ‘true value’ of the securities.”).
297 See, e.g., MHC Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners,
L.P. 761 F.3d 1121 (10th Cir. 2014) (Plaintiff’s allegation that issuer falsely
claimed that mortgage portfolio would not be further impaired under GAAP
based on internal analysis and input from independent experts rejected because it was an opinion); see also Omaha Civilian Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp.,
679 F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (Plaintiff’s allegations that goodwill review involving
valuation of certain assets should have been done earlier, at most, reflected
“failure to comply with Generally Accepted Accounting Principles [(“GAAP”)],
rather than their commission of securities fraud[.]”); Fait, 655 F.3d at 110–11
(calculations of goodwill depend on management’s judgment); Pa. Pub. Sys.
Emps.’ Ret. v. Bank of Am., 874 F. Supp. 2d 341, 351 (S.D.N.Y. 2012); In re
Lehman Bros. Sec. & ERISA Litig., 799 F. Supp. 2d 258, 312 (S.D.N.Y. 2011)
292
293
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ruled that it is not enough for plaintiffs to show a variance in their
approach to how a security should be valued—the plaintiff must
also show the dollar impact of the variance.298 Other cases emphasize the speculative nature of valuations of certain securities,
especially where there is no historical data to establish a value.299
In these cases, generalized disclaimers in a prospectus are sufficient
warnings to investors regarding subsequent adverse events.300
An interesting application of court views on valuation is In re
Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litigation.301 In that case, plaintiffs alleged that an analyst’s valuations were overly optimistic.302 The
plaintiffs argued the analyst had an inherent conflict of interest
in writing his reports since his employer was an underwriter to
the same issuers.303 The plaintiffs found emails where the analyst
doubted the veracity of his own reports.304 For reports written after
the emails, the court found that plaintiffs could allege a violation
of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5.305 However, for reports issued
prior to the emails, the court foreclosed liability. 306 The court’s
reasoning turned on a number of factors, including disclosure that
the research reports were speculative and that the analyses were
marked by a “very low predictability of fundamentals and a high
(discussing relevant accounting guidance permitting varying approaches to
value an asset that is left to management’s judgment).
298 See, e.g., Tsereteli v. Res. Asset Securitization Tr., 692 F. Supp. 2d 387,
393 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (discussing valuations that are not in conformity with
standard valuation guidelines are not actionable without more quantification
of the impact); Fulton Cty., 2010 WL 5095294, at *8 (discussing plaintiff failing
to show impact of the valuation flaws identified and whether it is comparable
to the actual write-off the issuer took).
299 See, e.g., N.J. Carpenters Vacation Fund v. Royal Bank of Scot. Grp., 720
F. Supp. 2d 254, 271 (S.D.N.Y. 2010) (offering materials disclosed risks because
of lack of historical data); Barclays, 2011 WL 31548, at *8 (offering materials
disclosing risks).
300 Supra note 299 and accompanying text.
301 See generally In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
302 Id. at 482, 492. The view that stock analysts may be conflicted or provide poor
advice is not a new one. In Benjamin Graham’s seminal work, The Intelligent
Investor, he notes that “many of them are compelled to analyze with one eye on the
stock ticker—a pose not conducive to sound thinking or worthwhile conclusions.”
BENJAMIN GRAHAM, THE INTELLIGENT INVESTOR, 264–65 (revised ed. 2006).
303 Salomon, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 483.
304 Id. at 485.
305 Id. at 493.
306 Id. at 492.
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degree of volatility, suitable only for investors/traders ... that can
withstand material losses.”307
The court described the reports as “detailed, transparent, and
primarily based on the companies’ own public statements, such
as press releases, financial statements, and analyst calls.”308 The
court implicitly suggested that this transparency permits investors
to draw their own conclusions or compare the reports to other
market information. The court observed that the plaintiffs failed
to show that the valuation models in the reports were “false or
objectively unreasonable[.]”309
The Salomon plaintiffs also argued that other valuation models
at the analyst’s firm assigned substantially lower valuations than
the analyst’s own work that was addressed in a subsequent court
decision.310 The court rejected the argument:
In contrast to ... objective statements, financial valuation models depend so heavily on the discretionary choices of the modeler ... choice of assumptions ... and choice of “comparables”
that the resulting models and their predictions can only fairly
be characterized as subjective opinions. Like other opinions,
some valuation models may be more or less reliable than other
models, have more or less predictive power, or hew more or less
closely to conventional wisdom on a subject, but they are nonetheless opinions and not objective facts. An analyst who sets
out his own opinion of a stock’s value based on the valuation
model he finds most persuasive for that company does not omit
a material fact by failing to note that others might have different opinions[.] 311

Id. at 490–91.
Id. at 491; see also Omaha Civilian Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., 679
F.3d 64, 69 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that the red flags identified by plaintiffs were
public, concluding therefore that the defendant’s “[stock] price would at all pertinent times have reflected the need for, if any, or culpable failure to undertake,
if any, interim impairment testing.”).
309 Salomon, 350 F. Supp. 2d at 491.
310 See In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 373 F. Supp. 2d 248, 351–52
(S.D.N.Y. 2005).
311 Id. at 251–52. The recent Supreme Court decision, Janus Capital Group
v. First Derivative Traders, may foreclose this type of suit in the future. See Janus
Cap. Grp. v. First Derivative Traders, 564 U.S. 135, 140–43 (2011). The Court
has read into Janus the requirement that the maker of a fraudulent statement
be authorized to speak on behalf of the entity that the investor relied. Id. For a
critique of the approach the Court took, see William A. Birdthistle, The Supreme
Court’s Theory of the Fund, 37 J. CORP. L. 771, 775–85 (2012).
307
308
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Although not involving valuation issues, the recent Supreme
Court decision in Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers’ District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund illustrates that liability for misrepresentations in fraud cases extends beyond whether the
speaker did not believe a stated opinion.312 In Omnicare, the Supreme Court provided hypothetical situations of an issuer’s opinion of its compliance that could rise to the level of fraud under the
securities laws:
Consider an unadorned statement of opinion about legal compliance: “We believe our conduct is lawful.” If the issuer makes
that statement without having consulted a lawyer, it could be
misleadingly incomplete. In the context of the securities market,
an investor, though recognizing that legal opinions can prove
wrong in the end, still likely expects such an assertion to rest
on some meaningful legal inquiry .... Similarly, if the issuer made
the statement in the face of its lawyers’ contrary advice, or with
knowledge that the Federal Government was taking the opposite view, the investor again has cause to complain: He expects
not just that the issuer believes the opinion (however irrationally), but that it fairly aligns with the information in the issuer’s
possession at the time.313

Because the alleged misstatements in Omnicare were made in
a registration statement, the Court focused on the context of an
opinion in such a document, noting “[i]nvestors do not ... expect
opinions contained in those statements to reflect baseless, off-thecuff judgments, of the kind that an individual might communicate
in daily life.”314 Similarly, investors expect an adviser’s pronouncement on the value of an investment to be much more than an offthe-cuff judgment.
Some cases decided prior to Omnicare have followed this approach. In Allstate, the court recognized three possible areas of
liability for opinion statements involving “expectations, beliefs, or
312 See Omnicare, Inc. v. Laborers’ Dist. Council Const. Indus. Pension Fund,
135 S. Ct. 1318, 1323–24 (2015). The alleged misrepresentations in Omnicare
did not involve an investment adviser or the valuation of an asset. The plaintiff
made allegations concerning an issuer’s registration statement, claiming that
its business complied with federal laws. Subsequent events proved the issuer’s statements were false and the plaintiff, who had purchased securities in the offering,
sued under Section 11 of the Securities Act. Id. at 1324.
313 Id. at 1328–29 (footnotes omitted).
314 Id. at 1330.
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projections[.]” 315 In addition to situations where the party does
not believe the opinion, liability could attach where “there was no
reasonable basis for the belief” or if “the speaker is aware of undisclosed facts tending seriously to undermine the statement’s accuracy.”316 These cases turn on whether red flags exist that the
person making the valuation has awareness. For example, a district
court decision in the Second Circuit addressed a claim asserting
that certain mortgage-backed securities were overvalued and mark
downs delayed.317 The court explained that because “valuations
ordinarily involve questions of business judgment, courts generally decline to find securities fraud stemming from statements
about valuations.”318 Although, when “parties maintain high valuations on [securities] in the face of red flags that the valuations
are inaccurate, courts have sustained securities fraud claims.”319
The court granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss the plaintiffs’
claim, it did so on other grounds—that plaintiff failed to plead loss
causation adequately.320 Another court, dealing with a fact pattern
involving an investment adviser, rejected the view that valuations
are opinions when they are alleged to be part of a larger fraudulent scheme:
315 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Robert W. Baird & Co., 765 F. Supp. 2d 1113,
1132 (D. Ariz. 2010).
316 Id. (citing Kaplan v. Rose, 49 F.3d 1363, 1375 (9th Cir. 1994)); see also
MHC Mut. Conversion Fund, L.P. v. Sandler O’Neill & Partners, L.P., 761 F.3d
1109, 1115–16 (“At common law today it is sometimes possible to pursue misrepresentation claims against fiduciaries and those who hold themselves out as
experts when they offer opinions that lack an objectively reasonable basis ....
[S]ome wonder whether this approach is consistent with the Supreme Court’s
teachings. As the defendants note, Virginia Bankshares seemed to endorse the
subjective disbelief/objective falsity test[.]”). Notably, the Tenth Circuit decided MHC prior to the Supreme Court’s decision in Omnicare.
317 See Stratte-McClure v. Morgan Stanley, 784 F. Supp. 2d 373, 376, 391
(S.D.N.Y. 2011).
318 Id. at 387.
319 Id.; see also Gosselin v. First Tr. Advisors L.P., No. 08 C 5213, 2009 WL
5064295, at *5 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 17, 2009); In re Flag Telecom Holdings Ltd. Sec.
Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 429, 453–54, 469 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re Van Wagoner
Funds, Inc. Sec. Litig., 382 F. Supp. 2d 1173, 1190 (N.D. Cal. 2004).
320 Stratte-McClure, 784 F. Supp. 2d at 390–91. Private plaintiffs alleging
violations under § 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act must prove loss
causation—the “causal link between the alleged misconduct and the economic
harm ultimately suffered by the plaintiff.” Emergent Cap. Inv. Mgmt., LLC v.
Stonepath Grp., Inc., 343 F.3d 189, 197 (2d Cir. 2013).
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Defendants argue that Plaintiffs have failed to allege facts that
support an inference that Defendants’ valuation assessments were
a part of a fraudulent scheme. Defendants argue that valuation
cannot be the basis of a fraud claim because the valuation is “an
exercise in discretionary business judgment involving consideration of a variety of factors.” However, Plaintiffs are not merely
contending Defendants did a poor job in making the valuation
assessments. Plaintiffs also contend that Defendants purposefully did the valuation assessments so as to conceal Defendants’
misconduct and increase fees.321

Cases exploring red flags often look to a number of objective
factors underlying the issuer of the securities. For example, in
Van Wagoner Funds, the court’s focus was on various events that
impaired the value of a mutual fund’s holding of issuer’s restricted
stock.322 The Van Wagoner plaintiffs sued the fund’s auditor, who
accepted the fund’s valuation of the securities at cost.323 According to the plaintiffs’ theory, the auditor was aware of a number of
negative events that affected the value of the issuer’s securities,
including a withdrawn public offering, the issuer’s bankruptcy,
change of business plans, announcement of layoffs, and generally
worsening business conditions.324 However, the court ultimately rejected the plaintiffs’ claims because “valuation policies were public,
as well as all adverse information about the restricted securities
in which Van Wagoner Funds had invested, the [investors] have not
alleged that [the auditor] concealed any facts from its investors.”325
In Flag Telecom Holdings, plaintiffs alleged that a publicly traded
company overvalued its trans-Atlantic fiber-optic cable until the
company entered bankruptcy and the prior management left.326
Plaintiffs contended that Flag was in a position to mark down the
value of the asset well before the bankruptcy because: (a) prices
Gosselin, 2009 WL 5064295, at *5 (citations omitted).
In re Van Wagoner, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1181. The Commission also brought
an enforcement matter against the adviser, which is discussed in note 92.
323 In re Van Wagoner, 382 F. Supp. 2d at 1181.
324 Id.
325 Id. at 1182. Courts have applied similar logic in other valuation contexts.
See, e.g., Omaha Civilian Emps.’ Ret. Sys. v. CBS Corp., 679 F.3d 64, 69 (2d
Cir. 2012); In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
326 In re Flag Telecom Holdings Ltd. Sec. Litig., 352 F. Supp. 2d 429, 436,
439, 442–43 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
321

322
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for usage on the cable declined by 70 percent annually from 1999–
2001; (b) the company consistently missed sales targets on the
route by 80–90 percent; (c) an executive commented that demand
had “imploded”; and (d) the company utilized “improper reciprocal
transactions” to prop up the value of the cable.327 The Flag plaintiffs’ relevant allegations withstood a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim.328
While not specifically addressing valuations, courts have also
explored the issue of when projections, which often form a basis
of fair value estimates, can be actionable.329 One key consideration
is whether the assumptions in a projection are completely inaccurate. For example, the Allstate case involved a municipal bond issuance to fund the construction of an event facility.330 Payment of
the bonds was to be funded in part from the revenue stream the
facility would generate.331 Projections in the official statements
showed that the revenue streams were sufficient to meet bond obligations.332 However, the projections were based on surveys of
communities that were four times the size of the metropolitan area
where the facility was being built. 333 The defendants commissioned, “or were at least aware of,” two other studies—which were
not disseminated to investors—which surveyed communities more
similar in size to the facility’s area and showed a lower revenue

Id. at 465.
Id. at 469.
329 There are also specific securities rules and regulations governing projections outside the context of investment advisers that are similar to case law
and the Omnicare approach. For example, Rule 3b-6 of the Exchange Act and
Rule 175 of the Securities Act provide a safe harbor for issuers providing projections in certain filings “unless it is shown that such statement was made or
reaffirmed without a reasonable basis or was disclosed other than in good faith.” 17
C.F.R. § 240.3b-6(a) (2015); 17 C.F.R. § 230.175(a) (2014). Item 10(b)(1) of Regulation S-K, which discusses projections in issuer filings, requires management to
have “a reasonable basis” for the projection. 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(1) (2014).
Some provisions may go beyond the case law. For example, Item 10(b)(3) also recommends that if projections are included in a filing, “the disclosures accompanying the projections should facilitate investor understanding of the basis for and
limitations of projections.” 17 C.F.R. § 229.10(b)(3) (2014).
330 Allstate Life Ins. Co. v. Robert W. Baird & Co., 756 F. Supp. 2d 1113,
1122 (D. Ariz. 2010).
331 Id. at 1123.
332 Id. at 1124.
333 Id. at 1125.
327
328
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stream.334 The Allstate court reasoned that since the projections
were based on “objectively verifiable demographic data, a fact-finder
could conclude with reasonable certainty that the [facility] would
be unable to generate” the events and attendees projected in the
offering statements.335
B. Commission Litigation Involving Valuation Issues
The Commission cases in federal courts involving valuation issues generally involve scenarios where the investment adviser’s
conduct is more akin to furthering a fraudulent enterprise.336 The
Commission, like private plaintiffs, faces high hurdles in litigation
involving the antifraud provisions.337 As a result, Commission actions tend to focus on fairly egregious conduct. For example, in
SEC v. Lauer, the primary defendant orchestrated a manipulation
of stock prices in order to inflate the value of private funds he
managed.338 Among his fraudulent actions, Lauer purchased large
Id. at 1124–25.
Id. at 1133 (emphasis added).
336 More recently, the Commission has generally moved toward bringing enforcement actions through administrative proceedings rather than federal courts.
For an interesting view of the phenomenon, see Susan D. Resley, Dealing With
The SEC’s Administrative Proceeding Trends, LAW360 (Jan. 13, 2015), http://
www.law360.com/articles/610688/dealing-with-the-sec-s-administrative-proceed
ing-trend [https://perma.cc/YGE8-TDNH]. However, some administrative respondents have begun challenging the growing use of administrative proceedings
on constitutional grounds. See, e.g., Hill v. SEC, 114 F. Supp. 3d 1297, 1304–05
(N.D. Ga. 2015). Litigation in this area is ongoing although challengers have
faced recent setbacks in their claims. See, e.g., Tilton v. SEC, 824 F.3d 276,
285–86 (2d Cir. 2016). The Commission has rejected constitutional challenges
and the D.C. Circuit has upheld the Commission’s decision in one matter. See,
e.g., In re Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Exchange Act Release No. 75837, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 4190, Investment Company Act Release No. 31,806
(Sept. 3, 2015), 2015 WL 5172953, aff’d Raymond J. Lucia Cos., Inc. v. SEC,
Slip Op., 2016 WL 4191191 (DC Cir., Aug. 9, 2016). In addition, the Commission has amended its rules of practice. See Amendments to the Commission’s
Rules of Practice, Exchange Act Release No. 34-78319 (July 13, 2016), https://
www.sec.gov/rules/final/2016/34-78319.pdf [https://perma.cc/2A82-NB7Y].
337 See supra note 280 for a discussion on this issue.
338 SEC v. Lauer, No. 03-80612-CIV, 2008 WL 4372896, at *12–13 (S.D. Fla.
Sept. 24, 2008). Another example of egregious conduct that settled is SEC v.
ICP Asset Management, LLC, which involved an adviser who sold CDOs in a
manner that made certain clients overpay for them, accruing excessive fees to
the advisory firm, and shielding other clients from losses. See ICP Asset Management, LLC, Litigation Release No. 22477, 104 SEC Docket 1, 2012 WL 3986214
334
335

2016]

OUTSIDE A BLACK BOX

51

amounts of the stock of shell companies with no operations, driving
the price of the shares upward.339 In one acquisition of $750,000, he
claimed the investment’s value at $70 million.340 Without these
transactions, the value of the private funds Lauer managed “would
have plunged.”341 The Court concluded that the manipulation allowed Lauer “to obtain illegally tens of million[s] of dollars in fees
by materially overstating” the valuation.342
The primary defendant in Lauer had at least two potential justifications for these valuations. The private funds’ manager had
the “discretion to value securities as ... reasonably determined when
they believed that the security did not represent its market
value.”343 The private funds’ board had no input in the process.344
In addition, Lauer retained a third party to provide valuations of
the funds’ holdings that supported the inflated values.345 However,
the egregiousness of the conduct to manipulate the stock prices of
the portfolio companies undermined these potential justifications.346
The Court also spent time critiquing the valuation reports, noting,
for example, that they did not follow standard appraisal practices
and utilized baseless and unrealistic projections.347 In short, the
court found Lauer’s valuations were unreasonably contrary to disclosed valuation methods.348
(Sept. 10, 2012); Complaint, SEC v. ICP Asset Mgmt., No. 10-CIV-4791 (S.D.N.Y.
filed June 21, 2010). For other examples, see Complaint, SEC v. Davis, No. 3:16CV-00285 (W.D.N.C. June 2, 2016) (settled matter alleging failure to mark
down value of defaulted loans in private fund portfolio); Complaint, SEC v.
Summit Asset Strategies, No. 2:15-CV-01429 (W.D. Wash. Sept. 4, 2015); SEC
Charges Seattle Area Hedge Fund Adviser with Taking Unearned Management Fees, Litigation Release No. 23334 (Sept. 4, 2015), https://www.sec.gov
/litigation/litreleases/2015/lr23334.htm [https://perma.cc/9SDT-CW57] (filed as
settled matter); SEC v. Balboa, No. 11 Civ. 8731(PAC), 2015 WL 4092328
(S.D.N.Y. July 6, 2015); see also In re Gilles T. De Charsonville, Exchange Act
Release No. 77,937, 2016 WL 3030885 (May 26, 2016).
339 Lauer, 2008 WL 4372896, at *12.
340 Id. at *15.
341 Id. at *19.
342 Id.
343 Id. at *5.
344 Id.
345 Id. at *6, *16.
346 Id. at *25.
347 Id. at *16. The court also described Lauer’s own view of these valuation
reports as “very creative.” Id.
348 Id.
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Other cases do attempt to address an adviser’s valuation procedures and methodology. For example, Rockies Fund, Inc. v. SEC
(which arose out of an appeal of an administrative decision) involved a business development company—a type of unregistered
closed-end investment company—which failed to disclose that it
held restricted shares of an issuer in its portfolio.349 As a result, the
shares were valued as if they were free-trading shares.350 However,
the company’s valuation policy required it to discount restricted
shares.351 Under these facts, the court upheld the Commission’s
decision and found violations of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of
the Exchange Act.352
Valuation cases that scrutinize the adviser’s valuation methodology have proven more challenging, even with Section 206(2) of
the Advisers Act as a tool. For example, SEC v. Mannion provides
an illustration of the difficulties in bringing such cases when there
is some ambiguity—and the possibility of a court viewing the valuation as a subjective opinion. 353 Mannion involved an adviser
that managed a private fund, which invested in illiquid and highrisk securities.354 The largest investment in the fund involved a
distressed publicly traded issuer.355 In addition to holding common stock, the fund extended a bridge loan to the company after
its bank cut off financial support.356 The fund also held convertible
debentures of the issuer.357 Unsurprisingly, the condition of this
company deteriorated.358 The Commission’s allegations included
claims that the securities holdings’ values were inflated, resulting
in the adviser receiving excessive management fees.359
Like Lauer, the private placement memorandum of the fund in
Mannion disclosed that the adviser had a great deal of discretion.
Rockies Fund, Inc. v. SEC, 428 F.3d 1088, 1096 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
“Free-trading stock” refers to shares that can be traded without any limitation. See Finnerty, supra note 36; Van Vleet & Gerber, supra note 36.
351 Rockies Fund, Inc., 428 F.3d at 1092.
352 Id. at 1098.
353 SEC v. Mannion, No. 1:10-CV-3374-WSD, 2013 WL 1291621, at *8 (N.D.
Ga. Mar. 25, 2013).
354 Id. at *2.
355 Id. at *2–3.
356 Id. at *3 (noting that the lender cut off financial support because the CEO
abruptly resigned, and the board announced an investigation into possible wrongdoing at the company).
357 Id. at *2.
358 Id. at *3.
359 Id. at *1.
349
350
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The adviser could adjust the value of illiquid securities to reflect
“fair value,” which could be “significantly higher or lower” than the
actual value of the investment.360 The Commission used an expert to
argue that the holdings were overvalued.361 The expert opined that
the restricted stock holdings were overvalued by at least $1.7 million,
but did “not offer an opinion on the extent to which the convertible
debentures and bridge loans should have been discounted.”362
The expert’s inability to determine the amount of inflation in
the securities’ value proved detrimental to the case. On a motion
for summary judgment, the court concluded that without such an
estimate, it was impossible to prove that the inflated value was a
material misrepresentation for purposes of the antifraud provisions in Section 206 of the Advisers Act and Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act.363 The court did uphold the claim
on the restricted stock, because the expert did opine on the
amount of overvaluation.364 However, the court cast some doubt
on the strength of the Commission’s case, noting that the overvaluation occurred in one month, and that the excessive management fee collected amounted to $2,107, 11 percent of the fees
collected in the vehicle that held the investment “and a much
smaller share of Defendants’ overall fees for 2005.”365 After losing
on a motion for rehearing,366 the Commission filed a motion to
dismiss the valuation claim entirely, and the Commission settled
the matter over other conduct related to misappropriation. 367
Id. at *3.
Id. at *4.
362 Id. The defense, coincidentally, also utilized an expert to justify the valuations. Id. at *6.
363 Id. at *14.
364 Id. at *10, *12.
365 Id. at *12. The court also rejected the Commission’s Section 10(b) and
Rule 10b-5 claim because it found that the overvaluations were not in connection
with any securities transactions. Id. at *11. The Commission could not show that
anyone who later invested in the private funds received the inflated value. Id.
366 See id. at *5.
367 See SEC v. Mannion, 28 F. Supp. 3d 1304, 1306 (N.D. Ga. 2014). The
Commission filed a similar action against Yorkville Advisors, LLC, which alleged
that certain investments of convertible debentures, convertible preferred stock,
and promissory notes in Yorkville managed private funds carried inflated values.
See Complaint, SEC v. Yorkville Advisors, LLC, No. 12-CV-7728 (S.D.N.Y. Oct. 17,
2012). The case is not resolved, although the Commission has survived a Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. See SEC v. Yorkville Advisors, LLC, No. 12-CV-7728 (GBD) 2013 WL 3989054, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
360
361
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This outcome is not dissimilar to some private litigations discussed earlier.368
Valuation issues have periodically arisen in matters outside the
context of investment advisers, business development companies,
or related entities in SEC litigation. Generally, cases outside the
adviser sector involve misvaluation as part of other broader, fraudulent conduct, such as an offering or accounting fraud.369 The propositions in these cases also provide guides on both the potential
avenues and limits of cases grounded in valuation claims.370
Values derived from projections are also a subject of litigation.371 One court has suggested that empirical evidence that is
inconsistent with a projection can serve as a basis for an action.372
In SEC v. Tecumseh Holdings Corp., a case concerning offering
fraud, a company’s projections of future performance were deemed
misleading when past performance—which was not disclosed to
investors—was inconsistent with the projection. 373 Generalized
disclaimers that a projection was a forward-looking statement that
may not come to fruition did not immunize the issuer from liability
in Tecumseh. 374 Consistent with other private litigations, the
court in SEC v. Merchant Capital, LLC supported the proposition
that projections must be modified when subsequent events do not
bear out the initial projection.375 Thus, when a projection that was
See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., SEC v. Merchant Cap., LLC, 483 F.3d 747, 750 (11th Cir. 2007);
Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 725 (9th Cir. 2003); SEC v. Tecumseh Holdings
Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d 340, 350 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
370 See, e.g., Merchant Cap., 483 F.3d at 771, 772; Ponce, 345 F.3d at 741;
Tecumseh Holdings Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 344, 356.
371 See supra note 321 and accompanying text.
372 Tecumseh Holdings Corp., 765 F. Supp. 2d at 354.
373 Id. at 352–54.
374 See id. at 350 (citing In re Time Warner Secs. Litig., 9 F.3d 259, 266 (2d
Cir. 1993) (proposing that projections are “not beyond the reach of the securities laws”)).
375 See, e.g., Merchant Cap., 483 F.3d at 767–68; Hekker v. Ideon Grp., Inc.,
No. 95-681-Civ-J-16, 1996 WL 578335, at *1, *6 (M.D. Fla., Aug. 19, 1996).
Merchant Capital also addressed disclaimers in the projections: “What may once
have been a good faith projection became, with experience, a materially misleading omission of material fact. As the Fifth Circuit has recognized, ‘[t]o warn
that the untoward may occur when the event is contingent is prudent, to caution that it is only possible for the unfavorable events to happen when they
have already is deceit.’” Merchant Cap., 483 F.3d at 769.
368
369
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made in good faith initially does not appear to be achievable because of subsequent events, continued affirmation of the projection
is actionable.376
Another case arising out of an appeal of an agency administrative decision, Ponce v. SEC, touched on accounting for an issuer’s
assets in a financial statement.377 In Ponce, an accountant provided
valuations for certain licenses and tooling that was reported in an
issuer’s financial statements.378 He valued the licenses based on
restricted shares another party exchanged to acquire the licenses.379
Although he valued the restricted shares at a discount—about $4.7
million—the accountant was aware that the issuer later purchased
the licenses for a substantially lower amount—about $125,000.380
The accountant also treated tooling of a prototype as an asset rather
than an expense, contrary to accounting guidance, further inflating
the value of the issuer.381
The accountant in Ponce attempted to argue that his certification of the issuer’s financial statements did not violate Section 10(b)
and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. 382 In particular, he noted
that his valuation methods were disclosed in the footnotes to the
financial statements.383 Although the court discussed that the valuation methodology was flawed,384 it focused on the accountant’s
own doubts that the valuation was accurate. Among other things,
the court noted the accountant “was fully aware of the problems
associated with the valuation method he used,” but “he nonetheless did not alter the valuation.”385 The accountant also admitted
he had “reservations” about his valuation of the licenses, and he “believed [the issuer] could not sell them for the assigned value.”386
Merchant Cap., 483 F.3d at 769.
Ponce v. SEC, 345 F.3d 722, 727–28, 731–32 (9th Cir. 2003).
378 Id. at 726.
379 Id. at 730.
380 Id. at 726–27.
381 Id. at 727.
382 Id. at 729–30.
383 Id. at 730.
384 Id. at 731. The accountant’s value was premised on the value of the stock
on the date the licenses were initially acquired in a reverse merger transaction.
Id. However, the court observed that the stock was “thinly traded.” Id. After
the purchase, the issuer acquired the shares for substantially less, casting significant doubt of the accountant’s valuation method. Id.
385 Id.
386 Id.
376
377
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III. UNDERSTANDING COURT APPROACHES TO VALUATION
AND ALTERNATIVES

A. Court Review of Valuation Disputes and the Business
Judgment Rule
As the case law demonstrates, courts have grappled with disputes involving valuation matters by treating an adviser’s value
as a subjective opinion.387 The approach of treating valuation in
fraud cases as opinions provides a layer of deference to an adviser’s valuation determination.388 As a result, it should be no surprise that the successful valuation cases pursued in federal courts
represent situations of fundamental breakdowns where the adviser is effectively operating a fraudulent enterprise or simply
fails to undertake the valuation process represented to clients and
investors.389 Further, while certain valuation protocols—through
statutory and rule-based requirements—are in place for registered funds, allowing for more scrutiny of the valuation process,
no such guideposts exist for private fund investors.390
The courts’ approach, however, often seems disconnected to
the process-driven approach in many Commission actions. Rather
than focus on the adviser’s process in arriving at a valuation,
courts tend to defer to the adviser as a valuation expert.391 On its
surface, this seems reasonable since an adviser’s primary function
is to identify investments that will ultimately appreciate. However,
significant implications follow from an adviser’s valuation determination, because the valuation sets out whether the client profits
from the investment and how much compensation the adviser is
entitled.392 A lack of scrutiny offers room for abuse.
Notably, the threshold issue of whether an opinion is a fraudulent statement in securities law appears in numerous other contexts. See Wendy Gerwick
Couture, Opinions Actionable as Securities Fraud, 73 LA. L. REV. 381, 386 (2013).
Valuations bear some distinction because of the central role of investment advisers
in that process and the various statutes and rules governing valuations. Id.
388 Id. at 386–87.
389 See Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 87.
390 See, e.g., Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-1(a) (2012).
391 See, e.g., Fait v. Regions Fin. Corp., 655 F.3d 105, 110 (2d Cir. 2011)
(calculations of goodwill depend on management’s judgment).
392 See, e.g., Statement Regarding “Restricted Securities,” Investment Company Act Release No. 5847, Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) ¶72,135 (1969) (finding valuation is “critically important” and determines investment managers’ salaries).
387
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Court deference in this area can be better understood by the
challenge of assigning a value to complex or illiquid securities.
Determining the value of a portfolio of large, liquid stock traded
on the New York Stock Exchange is a relatively straightforward
exercise. Alternatively, determining the value of restricted stock,
complex derivative products, or a collection of other hard-to-value
assets, involves an element of subjectivity that creates a range of
possible values that often rely on the judgment of the adviser. 393
A client who contracts with an adviser relies on the adviser’s skill in
assessing a value as it is set out in the investment contract. Arguably, a court may be poorly placed to step into the adviser’s shoes
and make a post hoc judgment on the appropriate value of a hardto-value security.394
The case treatment of valuation issues has a common law analog for corporate decision making.395 The business judgment rule
provides “a shield to protect directors from liability for their decisions.”396 As the Delaware Supreme Court explained, the business
judgment rule is “a presumption that in making a business decision the directors of a corporation acted on an informed basis, in
good faith and in the honest belief that the action taken was in the
best interest of the company.”397 One commentator has described
the business judgment rule as a “doctrine of abstention” that generally directs courts from refraining from reviewing a board’s decisions “unless exacting preconditions for review are satisfied.”398
The deferential judicial review of board decisions has policy
justifications. Judge Winter summed them up in Joy v. North:
First, shareholders to a very real degree voluntarily undertake the risk of bad business judgment. Investors need not buy
See, e.g., Fait, 655 F.3d at 108–11 (stating that there is no objective standard for determining the market value of assets).
394 See, e.g., Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982) (“[C]ourts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions.”).
395 See Donald C. Langevoort, Private Litigation to Enforce Fiduciary Duties
in Mutual Funds: Derivative Suits, Disinterested Directors and the Ideology of
Investor Sovereignty, 83 WASH. U. L.Q. 1017, 1030–32 (2005) (noting that courts
have come to view mutual funds as corporations, but argues this is inappropriate).
396 Gries Sports Enterprises Inc. v. Clev. Browns Football Co., Inc., 496
N.E.2d 959, 963–64 (Ohio 1984).
397 Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812 (Del. 1984).
398 Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 87.
393
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stock, for investment markets offer an array of opportunities
less vulnerable to mistakes in judgment by corporate officers.
Nor need investors buy stock in particular corporations. In the
exercise in what is genuinely a free choice, the quality of a firm’s
management is often decisive and information is available from
professional advisors. Since shareholders can and do select
among investments partly on the basis of management, the
business judgment rule merely recognizes a certain voluntariness in undertaking the risk of bad business decisions.
Second, courts recognize that after-the-fact litigation is a
most imperfect device to evaluate corporate business decisions.
The circumstances surrounding a corporate decision are not
easily reconstructed in a courtroom years later, since business
imperatives often call for quick decisions, inevitably based on
less than perfect information. The entrepreneur’s function is to
encounter risks and to confront uncertainty, and a reasoned
decision at the time made may seem a wild hunch viewed years
later against a background of perfect knowledge.
Third, because potential profit often corresponds to the potential risk, it is very much in the interest of shareholders that
law not create incentives for overly cautious corporate decisions. Some opportunities offer great profits at the risk of very
substantial losses, while the alternatives offer less risk of loss
but also less potential profit.... Given mutual funds and similar
forms of diversified investment, courts need not bend over
backwards to give special protection to shareholders who refuse to reduce the volatility of risk by not diversifying. A rule
which penalizes the choice of seemingly riskier alternatives
thus may not be in the interest of shareholders generally. 399

Judge Winter’s policy considerations for the business judgment
rule400 can handily be used as a rationale for the current court
692 F.2d 880, 885–86 (2d Cir. 1982).
Other commenters have provided similar descriptions of the fundamental
rationale for the business judgment rule. See, e.g., Todd M. Aman, Cost-Benefit
Analysis of the Business Judgment Rule: A Critique in Light of the Financial
Meltdown, 74 ALB. L. REV. 1, 11–20 (2010–11); Bainbridge, supra note 14, at 88–
90; Clark W. Furlow, Good Faith, Fiduciary Duties, and the Business Judgment
Rule in Delaware, 2009 UTAH L. REV. 1061, 1083–93 (2009); Richard Scarborough
& Richard Olderman, Why Does the FDIC Sue Bank Officers? Exploring the
Boundaries of the Business Judgment Rule in the Wake of the Great Recession, 20
FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 367, 372–75 (2015); Robert Sprague & Aaron J.
Lyttle, Shareholder Primacy and the Business Judgment Rule: Arguments for
Expanded Corporate Democracy, 16 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN., 1, 8–12 (2010). Andrew
Gold has framed the business judgment rule as an institutional choice against
judicial intervention because of the uncertain benefits of higher court scrutiny.
See Andrew Gold, A Decision Theory Approach to the Business Judgment Rule:
399

400
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treatment of valuation disputes, especially in the context of private
funds invested in illiquid securities. The Investment Company Act
limits the pool of investors eligible to subscribe to private funds
based on a minimum asset threshold or the number of investors.401
The rationale is that such individuals can better withstand more
risky investments and that they may be more sophisticated—and
better equipped—to evaluate the merits of such an investment.402
Further, the challenge of valuing an illiquid security creates a
greater possibility of variation because information is imperfect.
In the absence of tangible market data, there is greater reliance on
modeling techniques and values of analogous securities.403 Rather
than creating a definitive price, a valuation under these circumstances may fall within a reasonable range of values—consistent
with the Court’s view of valuations in Virginia Bankshares.404
There are generalized critiques of the business judgment rule
and arguments, 405 more particularly, that investment advisers and
Reflecting on Disney, Good Faith, and Judicial Uncertainty, 66 MD. L. REV.
398, 470–74 (2007).
401 Two provisions are commonly relied upon by funds to avoid the obligations under the Investment Company Act. Section 80a-3(c)(1) allows a fund to
avoid these obligations if there are no more than 100 investors in the fund. See
15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(1). Alternatively, an unlimited number of qualified investors
can participate in a private fund. See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-3(c)(7). The term “qualified investor” provides various eligibility standards to participate in private
funds, such as a requirement that an individual hold $5 million in investments.
See 15 U.S.C. § 80a-2(51)(A). In addition, other limited exceptions may allow
certain persons to participate in such funds without meeting the requirements
of being a qualified investor. See, e.g., 17 C.F.R. § 270.3c-5 (2012) (allowing
certain knowledgeable employees of the adviser and others to invest). Other
restrictions on the pool of private fund investors exist by virtue of the requirements to avoid registration obligations under the Securities Act. See Sklar, supra note 205, at 3278–79.
402 Tamar Frankel’s survey of Ponzi scheme victims and perpetrators suggests that wealthy and highly educated individuals also fall prey to such
schemes despite legal assumptions that they are better equipped to assess complex investments. See TAMAR FRANKEL, THE PONZI SCHEME PUZZLE 143–45
(2012); see also The Madoff affair: Con of the century, ECONOMIST (Dec. 18,
2008) http://www.economist.com/node/12818310/ [http://perma.cc/XG8V-KHMC]
[hereinafter Madoff Affair].
403 See, e.g., In re Salomon Analyst Level 3 Litig., 350 F. Supp. 2d 477, 491
(S.D.N.Y. 2004).
404 501 U.S. 1083, 1092–94 (1991).
405 See, e.g., Aman, supra note 400; Michelle M. Harner, Corporate Control
and the Need for Meaningful Board Accountability, 94 MINN. L. REV. 541
(2010); Sprague & Lyttle, supra note 400; see also J. Robert Brown, Jr., The
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investment companies should not be treated in a similar fashion as
other corporations.406 Some commenters propose greater judicial
scrutiny of board actions for all corporations in the wake of the
recent financial crisis.407 In the context of valuations, a business
judgment rule-like approach that adheres closely to Virginia
Bankshares and Omnicare introduces an element of caveat emptor
for the advisory client to evaluate an investment opportunity.408
Indeed, from the investor’s perspective, penetrating an adviser’s valuation in a private fund may be like attempting to peer into a black
box. Moreover, private fund investors themselves, which often represent the interests of retirees, charitable organizations, and other
financially unsophisticated individuals, are vulnerable to investment frauds.409 In the wake of many recent financial frauds, some
critics argue that financial regulators did not do enough to protect
investors in private funds.410
Demythification of the Board of Directors, 52 AM. BUS. L.J. 131, 195–96, n.314
(2015) (not critiquing the business judgment rule, but suggesting it as a possible catalyst for changes in corporate governance if courts applied it in a more
intrusive fashion).
406 See, e.g., Birdthistle, supra note 311, at 787–90; Langevoort, supra note
395, at 1032–40.
407 See, e.g., Aman, supra note 400, at 44 (“The business judgment rule no longer
appears justified on cost-benefit grounds.”); see also John Armour & Jeffrey N.
Gordon, Systemic Harms and Shareholder Value, 6 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 35 (2014),
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2307959 [https://perma.cc
/Q9QP-U78R] (arguing generally for enhanced corporate liability for risk-taking
behavior). Cf. Christine Hurt, The Duty to Manage Risk, 39 J. CORP. L. 253 (2014)
(arguing that an expanded legal duty concerning risk-taking administered by
courts would be unwieldy).
408 See generally Va. Bankshares, 501 U.S. 1083; Omnicare v. Laborers’ Dist.
Council Constr. Indus. Pension Fund, 135 S. Ct. 1318 (2015).
409 See, e.g., Madoff Affair, supra note 402.
410 See, e.g., Zelaya v. United States, No. 13-14780, 2015 WL 1402237 (11th
Cir. Mar. 30, 2015) (Plaintiffs allege that the SEC’s investigation into Stanford
Ponzi scheme was inordinately delayed). In a similar vein, other commenters
have criticized the SEC for failing adequately to police private funds. See, e.g.,
J.W. Verret, Review: Is Hedge Fund Registration Necessary?, 70 WASH. & LEE
L. REV. 705, 707–08 (2013) (critiquing regulatory response to Madoff and other
frauds and suggesting this as a justification for questioning whether additional
regulation in the field would better protect investors). An interesting point on
this issue is whether there is a gap between expectations of government oversight in an area that was previously lightly regulated. One can view this as a
form of government failure. See Barak Orbach, What is Government Failure?,
30 YALE J. REG. ONLINE 44, 53–55 (2013), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers
.cfm?abstract_id=2219709 [https://perma.cc/Q8H4-B7FG].
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B. A Process-Driven Approach for Valuation Disputes
One alternative to address valuation disputes in the private
fund space could be to empower courts to vary their scrutiny of an
adviser’s value of a portfolio security depending on the robustness
of the adviser’s valuation procedures. For more robust procedures,
a court would limit its review to confirming that the adviser followed
the disclosed procedures.411 For more arbitrary procedures, such as
a simple mandate to value securities based on the adviser’s good
faith, courts could scrutinize the actual value the adviser assigned
with other relevant factors to determine whether the valuation is
accurate.412 This two-tier approach has an added benefit to incentivize advisers to adopt more robust valuation procedures in order
to avoid greater court scrutiny. Courts and advisers already have
a reference point for robust valuation procedures from best practices guides in the private fund space413 and the valuation procedures in the Investment Company Act for registered investment
companies.414 At the same time, this approach frees advisers who
411 See, e.g., Jones v. Harris Assos. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 351 (2010) (reviewing
the board’s process to determine how adviser fees were set for claims involving
Section 36(b) of the Investment Advisers Act).
412 See, e.g., SEC v. Mannion, 789 F. Supp. 2d 1321, 1334 (N.D. Ga. 2011)
(finding the defendant’s good faith valuation efforts subject to further examination in Rule 10b-5 litigation); Fraternity Fund Ltd. v. Beacon Hill Asset
Mmgt. LLC, 376 F. Supp. 2d 385, 399 (S.D.N.Y. 2005) (upholding good faith
standard in the examination to specific organization valuation policies); In re
Allied Capital Corp. Sec. Litig., No. 02 Civ. 3812(GEL), 2003 WL 1964184 at
*4 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 25, 2003).
413 See, e.g., Int’l. Org. of Sec. Commissions, Principles for the Valuation of
Collective Investment Schemes: Final Report (May 2013), http://www.iosco.org
/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD413.pdf [http://perma.cc/8J9N-QGNF]; Hedge
Fund Standards Board, The Hedge Fund Standards (May 11, 2015), http:// www
.hfsb.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/04/Hedge-Fund-Standards-as-at-November
-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5PLL-JE44]; Int’l. Org. of Sec. Commissions, Principles for the Valuation of Hedge Fund Portfolios: Final Report. (Nov. 2007), http://
www.iosco.org/library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD253.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZE9M
-CRST]; Asset Managers’ Committee, Report of the Asset Managers’ Committee
to the President’s Working Group on Financial Markets, Best Practices for the
Hedge Fund Industry (Jan. 15, 2009), http://www.cftc.gov/idc/groups/public
/@swaps/documents/file/bestpractices.pdf [https://perma.cc/PP54-5DSN]; Alternative Investment Management Association, AIMA’s Guide to Sound Practices
for Hedge Fund Valuation (Mar. 2007), https://www.aima.org/download.cfm/doc
id/71F28FFC-C3C7-41A7-9B3490B58652DA3A [http://perma.cc/L7EF-BQNJ].
414 For example, courts could look to the Commission’s guidance over certain
types of hard-to-value securities in Accounting Series Releases 113 and 118.
Supra notes 34–42 and accompanying text.
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wish not to adopt such valuation practices to do so.415 However,
this proposed judicial approach requires a reinterpretation of the
antifraud provisions and the creation of new substantive rights at
least with respect to private claims.416 Such modifications could
be limited to rights either for the Commission to enforce or could
be broadened to form a private right of action.
There are analogs that are suggestive of how courts could proceed under such an approach. Under Delaware corporate law, courts
sometimes do not apply the business judgment rule in cases involving tender offers and other corporate takeover scenarios. In
those situations, courts and commenters have recognized the possibility that a corporation’s board of directors may have inherent conflicts of interest concerning a potential takeover, particularly in the
context of competing bids.417 Because of this conflict, Delaware
courts scrutinize board decisions more rigorously than the business judgment rule depending on the circumstances.418
Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc. provides an
example of the Delaware courts’ heightened scrutiny.419 In Revlon,
a firm made an unsolicited tender offer to acquire Revlon.420 After
See supra notes 34–42.
Some antifraud statutes available to Commission enforcement actions
do not require scienter as an element. In such cases, it is plausible for courts
independently to determine that providing inaccurate valuations in the absence of an adviser’s intent or recklessness to provide such a violation could be
a breach of fiduciary duty. In contrast, the scienter element of other antifraud
statutes, such as Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act, which are available to private
parties, would require legislative and rule changes. See 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5.
417 See, e.g., Paramount Comm., Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34 (Del.
1994); Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985) (“Because of the omnipresent specter that a board may be acting primarily in its
own interests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders, there
is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the threshold before the protections of the business judgment rule may be conferred.”); Stephen
M. Bainbridge, Unocal at 20: Director Primacy in Corporate Takeovers, 31 DEL.
J. CORP. L. 769, 788–89 (2006).
418 See Bainbridge, supra note 417, at 802–04 (providing an analysis of the
types of situations when a heightened standard of review may apply to a corporate takeover); see also Arnold v. Society for Sav. Bancorp, Inc., 650 A.2d
1270, 1289–90 (Del. 1990).
419 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986). The Revlon decision is a variant of heightened scrutiny involving defensive measures to prevent a hostile takeover. Id. Another
formulation is expressed in Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d. 946
(Del. 1985).
420 506 A.2d at 176.
415

416
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taking a number of defensive measures to repel the offer, Revlon’s
board authorized the company to conduct negotiations with other
potential bidders. 421 A white knight merger proposal emerged
from a friendly party that was slightly more attractive than the
initial tender offer.422 The proposal had a lockup provision that
precluded Revlon from considering other competing offers, effectively precluding the firm that made an unsolicited tender offer
to enhance the terms of its proposal.423 The Revlon court reviewed
and upheld Revlon’s various defensive tactics prior to the white
knight’s proposal.424
However, the Revlon court took a different—and much less
deferential—view of the lockup provision:
The Revlon board’s authorization permitting management to
negotiate a merger or buyout with a third party was a recognition that the company was for sale. The duty of the board had
thus changed from the preservation of Revlon as a corporate
entity to the maximization of the company’s value at a sale for
the stockholders’ benefit. This significantly altered the board’s
responsibilities under the Unocal standards. It no longer faced
threats to corporate policy and effectiveness, or to the stockholders’ interests, from a grossly inadequate bid. The whole
question of defensive measures became moot. The directors’
role changed from defenders of the corporate bastion to auctioneers charged with getting the best price for the stockholders
at a sale of the company.425

The court invalidated the lockup provision.426 The slight price improvement in the white knight’s offer did not justify a provision
that precluded continuing the auction for better bids.427
Id. at 177.
Id. at 178.
423 Id.
424 Id. 180–81.
425 Id. at 182.
426 Id. at 184.
427 Id. at 183–84. Commenters have often criticized Revlon for the potential
breadth of a board’s duty in being an “auctioneer.” Delaware courts have subsequently clarified the case and do not require a board to hold an outright open
auction. See, e.g., Barkan v. Armsted Indus., Inc., 567 A.2d 1279, 1286 (Del.
1989) (noting that “no single blueprint” exists for a board to satisfy its obligations);
Bainbridge, supra note 417, at 801–04; Franklin A. Gervutz, Removing Revlon, 70
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1485 (2013); Lyman Johnson & Robert Ricca, The Dwindling of Revlon, 71 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 167, 190–91 (2014); Christina M. Sautter,
Promises Made To Be Broken? Standstill Agreements in Change of Control
421
422
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In situations where enhanced review is considered appropriate,
Delaware courts focus on “the adequacy of the decision-making
process employed by the directors” and, depending on the circumstances, conduct “a judicial examination of the reasonableness of
the directors’ action in light of the circumstances then existing.”428
This second step may be avoided when the board’s process was
robust, and the board members who approved the transaction
were disinterested.429
Similar federal court scrutiny applies to registered investment
companies. The Investment Company Act, for example, places a
fiduciary duty on investment advisers “with respect to the receipt
of compensation for services” paid by a registered investment company.430 Private plaintiffs as well as the Commission can bring
actions431 and need not prove “personal misconduct” but rather
must prove “a breach of fiduciary duty.”432 Courts have set a fairly
high bar in bringing such cases—requiring a showing that an investment adviser “must charge a fee that is so disproportionately
large that it bears no reasonable relationship to the services rendered
and could not have been the product of arm’s-length bargaining.”433
In evaluating a claim, the Supreme Court acknowledged, “a measure of deference to a board’s judgment may be appropriate in some
instances.”434 A key circumstance in determining the deference to
Transactions, 37 DEL. J. CORP. L. 929, 942–43 (2013); Bernard S. Sharfman,
Shareholder Wealth Maximization and its Implementation under Corporate
Law, 66 FLA. L. REV. 389, 412 (2014).
428 Paramount Comm. Inc. v. QVC Network Inc., 637 A.2d 34, 45 (Del. 1994).
429 See, e.g., Lyondell Chem. Co. v. Ryan, 970 A.2d 235, 243–44 (Del. 2009).
See also Daniel J. Morrissey, M&A Fiduciary Duties: Delaware’s Murky Jurisprudence, 58 VILL. L. REV. 121, 153–54 (2013) (discussing Lyondell).
430 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2010).
431 There has been a recent spate of private actions invoking Section 80a-35.
These recent cases focus on two phenomena in the industry: the retention of the
bulk of the management fees by an adviser when a sub-adviser performs most
of the advisory function, and the question of whether an adviser is passing on
the savings from economies of scale in retail funds relative to the fees institutional clients pay. See Firms Fight Unprecedented Number of Excessive-Fee
Suits, FT IGNITES (Apr. 2, 2015) http://ignites.com/c/1089403 /115363?referr
_module=SearchSubFromIG&highlight=Firms%20Fight%20“Unprecedented”
%20Number%20of%20Excessive-Fee%20Suits [https://perma.cc/83SB-PWQD].
432 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-35(b) (2010).
433 Gartenberg v. Merrill Lynch Asset Mgmt., Inc., 694 F.2d 923, 928 (2d
Cir. 1982) (citations omitted).
434 Jones v. Harris Assocs. L.P., 559 U.S. 335, 349 (2010).
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afford a board’s decision to accept a fee arrangement turns on process. When a board’s process is robust, “a reviewing court should
afford commensurate deference to the outcome of the bargaining
process.”435 However, “where the board’s process was deficient or
the adviser withheld important information, the court must take
a more rigorous look at the outcome.”436
Commission enforcement action in the area of registered fund
reviews of advisory contracts has focused more specifically on the
process requirements in the Investment Company Act, typically
referred to as the “15(c) process.”437 The Investment Company Act
requires that the board of a registered investment company meet
in person to conduct an annual review of the advisory contract.438
A majority of independent directors must approve the contract.439
Further, the directors have a duty to request and evaluate information, and the adviser has a duty to furnish information reasonably necessary to evaluate the contract.440 The Commission has
brought several settled administrative actions in this area that have
typically focused on situations where the adviser allegedly failed
to provide material information to a registered fund’s board. 441
Court scrutiny of valuation determinations in private funds
based on the robustness of the adviser’s procedures has limitations.
For situations when courts grant great deference, it still leaves the
possibility that objectively inaccurate valuations would not be subject to court scrutiny. At the other end, courts may find themselves
scrutinizing complex valuations for which they are ill-equipped to
judge.442 In addition, developing a judicial benchmark for robust
Id. at 351.
Id. at 336.
437 See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2010). For cases
covering this area, see supra note 434.
438 See Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c).
439 See id.
440 See id.
441 See, e.g., In re Kornitzer Capital Mgmt., Inc., Investment Company Act
Release No. 31560, 2015 WL 1800393 (Apr. 21, 2015) (settled matter); In re
Chariot Advisors, LLC, Advisers Act Release No. 3872, 2014 WL 2986899
(July 3, 2014) (settled matter); In re Northern Lights Compliance Serv., LLC,
Investment Company Act Release No. 30,502, 2013 WL 1835420 (May 2, 2013)
(settled matter); In re Morgan Stanley Inv. Mgmt., Inc., Advisers Act Release
No. 3315, 2011 WL 5562535 (Nov. 16, 2011) (settled matter).
442 Courts have often struggled with valuation issues when questions arise
with hard-to-value assets. For example, Delaware courts often struggle with
435
436
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valuation procedures would require common law development, leaving advisers with some uncertainty over the strength of their own
valuation procedures. The Delaware common law and 15(c) process
also address somewhat distinct issues as compared to private fund
valuation practices. Both areas involve discrete events.443 Revlon
situations occur during hostile corporate takeover attempts—a
relatively rare event in a corporation’s life.444 The 15(c) process
and the related fiduciary duty obligations of Section 36(b) is an
annual event for the board of directors of registered investment
companies.445 In contrast, valuation determinations may be a daily
event for advisers.446 Elevated standards for valuation in this context could make the process cumbersome and costly if courts become
too aggressive in their review.
Other possible alternatives exist to address valuations in private
funds, but they may be much less desirable. For example, legislation
and Commission rulemaking could establish valuation procedures
not unlike those for registered investment companies.447 However,
this rules-based approach may lack the flexibility to address issues
unique to private funds or to change as the area evolves. Another
approach is to address the issue of limited judicial review indirectly
without changing the approach of the courts. For example, Congress
valuing minority shareholder stakes in situations where the shareholders are
being squeezed out. See, e.g., Gonsalves v. Straight Arrow Publishers, Inc., 793
A.2d 312, 315–16, 318 (Del. Ch. 1998), aff’d in part & rev’d in part, 725 A.2d
442 (1999); LeBeau v. M.G. Bancorporation, Inc., 1999 WL 44993 at *6–7 (Del. Ch.
1998), aff’d in part & remanded in part, 737 A.2d 513, 527 (Del. 1999). Such difficulties appear in other contexts. For example, the Surface Transportation Board
determines whether a railroad charges a monopolistic freight rate by developing a complicated economic model based on what a hypothetical stand-alone railroad
would charge. Like the valuation cases involving advisers, the Board’s level of
review was historically deferential to the railroad. See Salvatore Massa, Injecting Competition in the Railroad Industry, 27 TRANSP. L.J. 1, 19–22 (2000).
443 Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(c) (2010).
444 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1990).
445 Section 80a-15(a)(2) of the Investment Company Act limits the length of the
advisory contract to two years, but nonetheless the contract may be continued if
approved at least annually by the board or by vote of a majority of the outstanding
voting securities. Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. § 80a-15(a)(2) (2010).
446 The frequency of valuation can vary by the terms of a private fund’s offering memorandum. In contrast, for open-end mutual funds, Rule 22c-1(b) requires daily valuation of the current net asset value of the fund. Investment
Company Act, 17 C.F.R. § 270.22c-1(b).
447 See 17 C.F.R. § 270.2a-1(c).
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and the Commission could further limit the pool of investors who
may be eligible to participate in private funds. Under the current
legal framework, private funds seek exemptions from registration
under the Securities Act and the Investment Company Act.448 In
order to meet these exemptions, the previous funds must ensure that
investors meeting certain criteria participate in the private fund.
At a minimum, investors must meet the requirement of being accredited investors,449 and, in many instances, the investor must
meet the higher standard of being a qualified investor.450 These
rules could be modified to target certain classes of investors who
may be more severely impacted by a valuation dispute, such as pension funds.451 Beyond identifying perceived vulnerable groups, the
rules could raise net worth requirements or alternatively limit the
amount of assets any investor could place into a private fund to
avoid situations where the investor is “all in” on one investment.
Under this approach, limiting the pool of eligible investors cabins
the adverse impact of limited judicial review on investors.
Investment Company Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 80a-3(c)(1), 80a-3(c)(7) (2010).
Private funds operating under Section 3(c)(1) of the Investment Company Act are limited to offering the fund to no more than 100 investors. See
supra note 401. Beyond the limitation in the number of investors, such funds
will seek an exemption to the registration requirements of the Securities Act.
The Securities Act provides such an exemption for offerings to accredited investors. See id.; 17 C.F.R. § 230.501 (2014). An “accredited investor” is defined
under Rule 501(a) of Regulation D. Generally, for an individual to be an accredited investor, he or she must have earned income that exceeds $200,000
(or $300,000 together with a spouse) or must have a net worth of $1 million
(excluding the value of the person’s residence).
450 See supra note 417 for a discussion on the qualified investor concept.
451 Section 413(b)(2)(A) of the Dodd-Frank Act directed the Commission to
review the accredited investor standard. See Net Worth Standard for Accredited
Investors, SEC Release No. 3144, Securities Act Release No. 9177, Investment
Advisers Act Release No. 3144, Investment Company Act Release No. 29,572,
2011 WL 231559, at 4–5 (Jan. 25, 2011), https://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2011
/33-9177.pdf [https://perma.cc/R24R-XPE7]. Recent views on this topic have considered creating exceptions to the accredited investor standard. For example, the
Division of Corporation Finance issued a report on the accredited investor standard suggesting opening up the exemption to certain individuals, including all
entities with investments in excess of $5 million. U.S. SEC. & EXCHANGE COMM.,
REPORT ON THE REVIEW OF THE DEFINITION OF “ACCREDITED INVESTOR” (2015),
https://www.sec.gov/corpfin/reportspubs/special-studies/review-definition-of-ac
credited-investor-12-18-2015.pdf [https:// perma.cc/836Y-7FL3]; see also Michael
S. Piwowar, Capital Unbound: Remarks at the Cato Summit on Financial Regulation (June 2, 2015) (transcript available at sec.gov), https://www.sec.gov
/news/speech/capital-unbound-cato-summit.html#_ftnref9 [https://perma.cc/T4JM
-UN2Y].
448
449
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However, such rules are a blunt tool to address the narrower
issue of limited judicial review. They risk limiting access to private funds to investors who are prepared to undertake the risks
inherent in such investments, including limited judicial review.
Like any possible detailed rules governing valuations, elaborate
rules over the area may become obsolete as the characteristics of
investors and private funds evolve.452
CONCLUDING REMARKS
An investment adviser’s valuation of assets for a client’s account or for a pooled investment vehicle is one of the most critical
functions an adviser performs that impacts fees and the returns
the investor has reaped. It is unsurprising that the federal securities laws have developed extensive guidance for registered investment companies. Aside from limited guidance for registered
investment companies, the legal framework for these funds has
focused on process-driven requirements rather than forming objective standards on how an adviser should value a security. The
process-driven approach never determines whether a valuation is
per se inaccurate, rather it looks to the process of how the adviser
made the valuation decision. This approach recognizes the limitations of regulators and courts in their ability to, on a de novo basis
and with the benefit of hindsight, value a fund’s portfolio assets—
particularly hard-to-value securities.
There are potential areas that could be developed further in the
enforcement of federal securities laws. One area—Section 206(2)
of the Advisers Act—could be further developed to address the scope
of an adviser’s fiduciary duty over valuations. A second broader
area is whether additional requirements and guidance over registered fund valuations should be utilized for private funds. Recent
reforms in the federal securities laws moved toward convergence in
adviser standards of conduct over registered investment companies
and private funds.453 Continued convergence may not be desirable,
Tom Lin has observed that securities regulation has often approached
investor protection by focusing on a homogenous concept for investors. See Tom
C.W. Lin, Reasonable Investor(s), 95 B.U. L. REV. 461, 464–65 (2015). He argues
for a heterogeneous approach to crafting investor protection policies, recognizing
that the expectations of investors vary along several different factors. Id. He focuses particularly on the rise of algorithmic investors and the need for flexible
principles based regulation because of the risk of regulatory obsolescence. Id.
453 Convergence reflects a continuation of recent securities laws reforms
that have required registration of many private fund advisers. Prior to the
452
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however, because registered investment companies and private
funds have different investment mandates.
Unlike investors of mutual funds, investors of private funds
stand on distinctly perilous ground. Although the Advisers Act provides some tangential requirements that affect valuations, successful cases brought by regulators center on situations of outright
fraud—often involving situations where the adviser misrepresented their disclosed valuation procedures. Investors—who do not
have standing to bring actions under the Advisers Act—must rely
on antifraud concepts in federal courts. As a result, for private litigants challenging an adviser’s valuation in federal court, opaque
disclosed valuation procedures are likely to lead a court to defer to
an adviser’s valuation. The private fund valuation becomes a black
box—a mystery that the ultimate investor cannot penetrate.454
To make matters worse, courts have elected to view valuation as
opinions, providing advisers wide latitude in how they value securities. Although the opinion concept is expressed in these decisions,
a better perspective of court treatment of adviser decisions is to
view them like board decisions of a corporation and the concept of
implementation of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, many private fund advisers were exempt from registration and largely
avoided the obligations of the Advisers Act with the exception of the antifraud
provisions. See 76 Fed. Reg. 42,950 (July 19, 2011) (to be codified in 17 C.F.R.
pts. 275, 279). However, with only limited exception such advisers are now registered and subject to all of the obligations of the Advisers Act. See supra Section I.B.1. Another example of convergence is the requirement for advisers and
registered investment companies to develop policies and procedures that are
implemented together and complement each other. See 68 Fed. Reg. 72, 714
(Dec. 24, 2003) (request for comment 17 C.F.R. pts. 270, 275, 279).
454 Although one could argue that the lack of transparency is the argument
for investors not to participate in such funds, fees and performance may also
be reasons. Fees and performance concerns have recently been cited as reasons
for exits by large institutional investors from private funds. See David Oakley,
Investors lose the lovin’ feeling for hedge funds, FIN. TIMES (Sept. 21, 2014),
https://www.ft.com/content/fad8fe2c-3fef-11e4-936b-00144feabdc0 [https://per
ma.cc/RZA8-FEB5] (noting that CalPERS, the Los Angeles Fire Fighters’ and
Police Officers’ pensions system, the Louisiana Firefighters’ retirement system, and
the San Diego Country employees’ retirement system have pulled out of such
investments). Famed investor Warren Buffett is similarly a critic and is currently winning a friendly wager with a private fund manager that an S&P 500
Index fund will outperform a portfolio of private funds over a ten-year period—
2008–2018. See Stephen Foley, Warren Buffett versus the hedge funds, FIN. TIMES
(May 4, 2015), https://www.ft.com/content/946ade3c-f235-11e4-892a-00144feab7de
[https://perma.cc/C37Y-9L6A].
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the business judgment rule. In short, it is debatable whether courts
have struck the right balance in evaluating valuation disputes.
Courts should approach valuation disputes differently. Deference to the private fund adviser’s valuation should be based on
the robustness of the adviser’s valuation methodology. A processdriven approach gives deference to advisers who have developed
and followed effective valuation procedures while scrutinizing
those with more vague mandates in the valuation area. Courts
have several reference points on how to demarcate robust valuation procedures and can draw from private fund industry groups
as well as requirements for registered investment advisers. Such
an approach recognizes the difficulty in valuing certain securities
because it defers to advisers who have made the appropriate effort to reach an accurate value, while scrutinizing those where the
potential for abuse is most likely. Courts have fallen short in this
area in part because the legal infrastructure does not exist. However, the necessary changes are hardly radical extensions of existing concepts, such as the general concept that an adviser has a
fiduciary duty to its client that has been recognized for well over
fifty years.455 A process-driven approach also avoids the more nettlesome questions regarding framing the specific scope of fiduciary
duties around valuation that are now underway in other areas of law
involving financial advisers.456

SEC v. Cap. Gains Res. Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180, 194 (1963).
The U.S. Department of Labor has extended its fiduciary rules to pension
and other advisers. See 81 Fed. Reg. 20,946 (Apr. 8, 2016) (to be codified at 29
C.F.R. pts. 2509, 2510, 2550). The new rules have generated a great deal of controversy and have spurred litigation. See Stephen Foley, US makes concessions
on retirement advice fees, FIN. TIMES (Apr. 6, 2016), https://www.ft.com/content
/89d44a66-fb72-11e5-8f41-df5bda8beb40 [https://perma.cc/T4XR-43CB]; see also
Chamber of Commerce v. Perez, Case No. 3:16-CV-01476-G, (N.D. Tex., Complaint filed Jun. 1, 2016).
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